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COMMENT
DUE PROCESS AND TRUE CONFLICTS: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON
EXTRATERRITORIAL FEDERAL
LEGISLATION AND THE
CUBAN LIBERTY AND DEMOCRATIC
SOLIDARITY (LIBERTAD) ACT OF 1996
International commerce and business transactions have become in-
creasingly important as national economies continue to integrate within
the global economy.' Moreover, the United States has changed its for-
eign policy tools in response to the end of the Cold War.2 In the last ten
years, the United States has increasingly focused on the use of economic
sanctions, embargoes, and threats of private legal action in its courts, as
1. See David P. Levine, Global Interdependence and National Prosperity, in U.S.
TRADE POLICY AND GLOBAL GROWTH 37-56 (Robert A. Blecker ed., 1996) (examining
the impact of international economic interdependence upon international, regional, and
country levels); Souathana Sokhom, The Trade War of the Twenty-First Century, in INTER-
NATIONAL TRADE AND THE NEW ECONOMIC ORDER. 111-25 (Raul Moncarz ed., 1995)
(discussing the integration of national economies within the context of international trad-
ing blocs); Kenneth W. Dam, Extraterritoriality in an Age of Globalization: The Hartford
Fire Case, 1993 Sup. Cr. REV. 289, 290-93 (explaining how the U.S. economy has become
increasingly integrated with, and interdependent upon, other leading national economies in
the world economy). See generally A.D. NEALE & M.L. STEPHENS, INTERNATIONAL BusI-
NESS AND NATIONAL JURISDICTION 3-20 (1988) (examining transnational business transac-
tions and the exercise of jurisdiction by U.S. courts); 2 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON INDUS.
COMPETITIVENESS, GLOBAL COMPETITION: THE NEW REALITY 174-75 (1985) (describing
the integration of the United States into the global economy and the effects of increased
competition on national trade policy); Symposium, Interdisciplinary Approaches to Interna-
tional Economic Law, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 595 (1995) (examining the historical
development of international economic law and "new theories" in the study of interna-
tional law in relation to international economic regulation).
2. See ORDER AND DISORDER AFTER THE COLD WAR 277-366 (Brad Roberts ed.,
1995) (examining international economic relations and evolution of national foreign poli-
cies and international businesses after the end of the Cold War); Jeffrey E. Garten, Ameri-
can Trade Law in a Changing World Economy,. 29 INT'L LAW. 15, 19-21 (1995) (examining
the development of "more comprehensive and more complex" U.S. trade law in the post-
Cold War international economy).
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opposed to threats of nuclear weapons or promises of billions of dollars
of economic aid, to achieve long term foreign policy objectives.
Congress has played an important role in this trend by formulating leg-
islation that advances United States foreign policy goals.4 In particular,
Congress may enact legislation that creates subject matter jurisdiction 5
3. See MICHAEL P. MALLOY, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND U.S. TRADE 191-220 (1990)
(surveying and analyzing the United States's invocation of economic and trade sanctions);
Barry E. Carter, International Economic Sanctions: Improving the Haphazard U.S. Legal
Regime, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1162, 1163-66, 1170-75 (1987) (reviewing international economic
sanctions imposed by the United States). Both the President and Congress play roles in
the trend towards economic sanctions. See Lung-chu Chen, Constitutional Law and Inter-
national Law in the United States of America, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 453, 475-78, (Supp. 1994)
(describing the inter-relationship between presidential and congressional foreign affairs
powers); cf Michael J. Glennon, Foreign Affairs and the Political Question Doctrine, 83
AM. J. INT'L L. 814 (1989) (examining the role of judicial review in relation to issues that
arise between the exercise of foreign affairs powers of both Congress and the executive
branch regarding international affairs matters). The president has increasingly resorted to
executive orders imposing various restrictions on trade and investment in foreign coun-
tries. See Carter, supra, at 1170 n.22 (reviewing sanctions authorized by the president);
Garten, supra note 2, at 23-25 (examining the increased powers granted to the president
under section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act, which authorizes the president to impose retalia-
tory trade sanctions against countries whose activities have a negative impact on U.S. trade
and foreign policy objectives); President Clinton Signs into Law Legislation to Punish For-
eign Firms Investing in Iran, Libya, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 32, at 1273 (Aug. 7,
1996) (reporting on presidential sanctions against Iran and Libya). The President's power
to impose economic sanctions is authorized under the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1702 (1994). This act allows the President to declare a
"national emergency" in regard to threatened national security or economic and trade in-
terests, and then impose sanctions or restrictions on imports, exports, or commercial trans-
actions. Id.
Congress has increasingly interposed itself in the formulation of U.S. foreign policy by
enacting legislation which imposes sanctions on foreign entities. See Garten, supra note 2,
at 19-21 (examining the historical trend of increased congressional involvement in formu-
lating American trade policies); cf John Linarelli, International Trade Relations and Sepa-
ration of Powers Under the United States Constitution, 13 DICK. J. INT'L L. 203, 208-22, 225-
40 (1995) (examining the tensions between Congress and the president resulting from con-
gressional restrictions of presidential authority in international trade matters).
4. See Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 57-58 (1958) (noting that Congress has the
power to enact legislation to regulate foreign affairs even though there is no explicit Con-
stitutional grant of such power); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 712 (1893)
(noting that the foreign affairs power expanded Congress's legislative authority in interna-
tional relations matters).
The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution vests Congress with the power
"[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see also JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW § 6.3, at 208-10 (5th ed. 1995) (noting that the Supreme Court has recognized
Congress's expansion of its implied foreign affairs powers and upheld its involvement in
foreign affairs); Chen, supra note 3, at 481-90 (describing Congress's foreign affairs
powers).
5. See Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456
U.S. 694, 702-03 (1982) (finding subject matter jurisdiction is derived from Article III of
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for United States courts over the extraterritorial activities6 of foreign na-
tionals, corporations, or sovereign entities. 7 The extraterritorial exten-
sion of United States law is becoming a primary method Congress
employs to advance United States foreign policy objectives and to protect
United States economic interests.8 In enacting extraterritorial legislation,
Congress may ignore or violate principles of international law, provided it
articulates a specific intent to do so.9 Congressional extraterritorial legis-
the Constitution, which establishes the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts); BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1425 (6th ed. 1990) (defining subject matter jurisdiction as a court's
"power to deal with the general subject involved in the action"); see also Mark R. Joelson,
Subject Matter Jurisdiction, 6 1Nr'L Q. 140, 143-51 (1994) (providing a concise and compre-
hensive survey of federal subject matter jurisdiction in U.S. courts).
6. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 588 (6th ed. 1990) (defining extraterritorial as
"[b]eyond the physical and juridical boundaries of a particular state or country").
7. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) ("Congress has the
authority to enforce its laws beyond the territorial boundaries of the United States."); see
also Andreas F. Lowenfeld, U.S. Law Enforcement Abroad: The Constitution and Interna-
tional Law, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 880, 881-84 (1989) (examining the extraterritorial scope of
legislation designed to reach criminal conduct outside the territorial limits of the United
States).
8. See Lea Brilmayer, The Extraterritorial Application of American Law: A Method-
ological and Constitutional Appraisal, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 11, 14-16 (1987) (re-
viewing the methodologies utilized to apply United States law abroad); Lea Brilmayer &
Charles Norchi, Federal Extraterritoriality and Fifth Amendment Due Process, 105 HARV.
L. REV. 1217, 1223 (1992) (concluding that the "extraterritorial application of American
law has become a potent tool for effectuating American foreign policy"); Mark P. Gibney,
The Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Law: The Perversion of Democratic Governance,
The Reversal of Institutional Roles, and The Imperative of Establishing Normative Princi-
ples, 19 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 297, 304-05 (1996) (discussing the purpose and intent
behind the extraterritorial application of U.S. law and concluding that U.S. law is applied
extraterritorially when it "serve[s] the national interest of the United States or its corpo-
rate actors"); cf. Increased Use of Extraterritoriality Could Threaten International Business,
53 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1334, at 532 (Oct. 1, 1987) (examining the
increased use of the "effects doctrine" by the international community to justify the appli-
cation of domestic laws to foreign conduct occurring abroad).
9. See Arabian Am. Oil, 499 U.S. at 248 (finding congressional legislation, "unless a
contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States" (quoting Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281,285 (1949))); Lauritzen v.
Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 578, 579 n.7 (1953) (stating that a finding of congressional intent is
required to apply U.S. legislation extraterritorially); Commodities Futures Trading
Comm'n v. Nahas, 738 F.2d 487,495 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("Federal courts must give effect to a
valid, unambiguous congressional mandate, even if such effect would conflict with another
nation's laws or violate international law."); United States v. Pinto-Mejia, 720 F.2d 248, 259
(2d Cir. 1983) (examining congressional intent to regulate conduct outside the United
States); Pacific Seafarers, Inc. v. Pacific Far E. Line, Inc., 404 F.2d 804, 812 n.20 (D.C. Cir.
1968) (noting U.S. courts have a greater obligation to follow U.S. law that is inconsistent
with international law than U.S. law that is inconsistent with the Constitution); United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945) (finding that if Con-
gress intended extraterritorial effect, federal courts could not disregard U.S. law). But see
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) ("International law is part of our law, and
must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction
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lation, however, cannot disregard the due process constraints of the
United States Constitution.1" Constitutional law considerations override
contradictory legislative preferences."
The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of
1996,12 also referred to as the Helms-Burton Act, is one of the most re-
..... ); Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580, 599 (1884) (explaining that U.S. courts cannot
look beyond U.S. treaties and acts of Congress); Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 (2
Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (noting that "an act of Congress ought never to be construed to
violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains"). See generally 1
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403 (1986) [hereinafter RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD)] (explaining when a state may exercise legislative jurisdiction over a non-
state resident); LEA BRILMAYER, AN INTRODuCrION TO JURISDICTION IN THE AMERICAN
FEDERAL SYSTEM 298 (1986) (explaining that congressional intent prevails over contrary
international law arguments when Congress is explicit); Gary B. Born, A Reappraisal of the
Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Law, 24 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1, 5 (1992) ("Congress
possesses the power under the Constitution to enact legislation notwithstanding the fact
that it violates principles of public and private international law."); Brilmayer & Norchi,
supra note 8 at 1218-23 (explaining the prevalence of congressional intent over contraven-
ing international legal principles and the importance of Constitutional limitations upon
congressional extraterritorial legislation).
10. See United States v. Thomas, 893 F.2d 1066, 1067-69 (9th Cir. 1990) (explaining
that the application of a U.S. statute cannot violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment); Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300,
307 (2d Cir. 1981) (finding congressional legislation attempting to link personal jurisdiction
to subject matter jurisdiction is limited by the due process clause); Walpex Trading Co. v.
Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales Bolivanos, 712 F. Supp. 383, 390 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (stating
that Congress cannot "override the constitutional due process constraints underlying per-
sonal jurisdiction"); 2 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 9, § 721, at 230-31 (stating that
constitutional protections apply to and limit federal foreign affairs action); John A.
Ragosta, Aliens Abroad: Principles for the Application of Constitutional Limitations to Fed-
eral Action, 17 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 287, 300, 310-11 (1985) (explaining that constitu-
tional constraints on government action are equally applicable to the government's foreign
affairs powers); cf 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 9, § 403(2), at 244-45 (discussing
the reasonableness test regarding the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a person or
foreign sovereign); Jonathan I. Charney, Judicial Deference in Foreign Relations, 83 AM J.
INT'L L. 805, 807 (1989) ("[T]he Constitution does not exclude or limit the courts' author-
ity in cases or controversies touching on foreign relations .... Judicial deference or absten-
tion in such cases may compromise the authority of the federal courts.").
11. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803) (holding that the
Constitution supersedes a congressional enactment that is in opposition to the Constitu-
tion); see also Texas Trading, 647 F.2d at 307 (noting congressional action is limited by the
due process clause); Walpex Trading, 712 F. Supp. at 390 (finding constitutional due pro-
cess constraints restricted Congress's power in drafting the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act); Brilmayer & Norchi, supra note 8, at 1220 ("Constitutional law arguments... trump
contrary legislative preferences."); cf. Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of
Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 57-58 (1985) (explaining that federal courts have the
final determination on whether congressional legislation is constitutional).
12. Act of Mar. 12, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-114, § 1 et seq., 110 Stat. 785 (to be codified
at 22 U.S.C. § 6021 et seq.) The primary sponsors of the legislation were Jesse Helms, a
Republican Senator from North Carolina and Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, and Congressman Dan Burton, a Republican Representative from Indiana
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cent examples of extraterritorial legislation. 3 In an effort to promote the
downfall of Fidel Castro's communist regime and facilitate Cuba's transi-
tion to democracy, this legislation attempts to deter foreign investment in,
and foreign trade with Cuba. 4 Title III of the Helms-Burton Act pro-
vides the means of deterrence,15 by broadly imposing civil liability for
engaging in commercial activity related to property located in Cuba that
and Chairman of the House of Representatives International Relations Committee's Sub-
committee on the Western Hemisphere. See LEADERSHIP DIRECTORIES, INC., CONGRES-
SIONAL YELLOW BOOK, Fall 1996, at 1-71, 11-49.
13. For examples of specific extraterritorial legislation, see Iran and Libya Sanctions
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, 110 Stat. 1541, 1543 (requiring the president to impose
sanctions on foreign companies that invest in the oil and gas industries of Iran or Libya);
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat.
1214, 1292-93 ("There is extraterritorial Federal jurisdiction.., over an offense under this
section."); Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989, 18 U.S.C. § 175(a) (1994)
("There is extraterritorial Federal jurisdiction over an offense under this section committed
by or against a national of the United States."); Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act, 46
U.S.C. § 1903(h) (1994) ("This section is intended to reach acts of possession, manufacture,
or distribution outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.").
14. See § 3,110 Stat. at 788-89; see also Department of Justice Summary of the Provi-
sions of Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of
1996, 61 Fed. Reg. 24,955 (1996) (noting Title II1 discourages foreign investment in Cuba).
15. §§ 301-306, 110 Stat. at 814-22. Section 301(11) of Title III states:
"To deter trafficking in wrongfully confiscated property, United States nationals
who were the victims of these confiscations should be endowed with a judicial
remedy in the courts of the United States that would deny traffickers any profits
from economically exploiting Castro's wrongful seizures."
§ 301(11), 110 Stat. at 815; see infra notes 36-42 and accompanying text (examining the
provisions of Title III).
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the Castro regime1 6 confiscated from United States citizens17 and then
expropriated and nationalized after it came to power in 1959.18
Upon its enactment, the Helms-Burton Act immediately provoked un-
paralleled hostile reactions from the international community, especially
the major trading partners of the United States, including Canada, Mex-
ico, and the European Union. 9 Opponents of this controversial legisla-
16. See § 302(a)(1), 110 Stat. at 815. After the Castro regime came to power on Janu-
ary 1, 1959, it began to systematically confiscate and nationalize all commercial businesses
in Cuba, including those that were foreign-owned. See Matias F. Travieso-Diaz, Alternative
Remedies In A Negotiated Settlement of the U.S. Nationals' Expropriation Claims Against
Cuba, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 659, 660-64 (1996) (discussing the history of Cuban
expropriations). This process was completed in 1968, but by 1963 almost all significant
businesses and industrial plants were expropriated. See id. According to the Foreign
Claims Settlement Commission of the United States, the total value of expropriated U.S.
property in Cuba is estimated at over $1.8 billion. See FOREIGN CLAIMS SETrLEMENT
COMM'N OF THE UNITED STATES, 1994 ANNUAL REPORT 148 (1994) (reporting the value
of property seized in Cuba from 1967 to 1972).
17. See § 302(a)(1), 110 Stat. at 814. The term "United States national" also includes
Cuban nationals who became naturalized United States citizens after fleeing from Cuba
when the Castro regime gained control. See § 4(15), 110 Stat. at 791 (defining a United
States national as "any United States citizen"). This controversial issue has raised ques-
tions regarding the propriety of allowing Cuban exiles who were not American citizens at
the time of the expropriations to sue under Title III of Helms-Burton. See Louis F. De-
sloge, The Great Cuban Embargo Scam: A Little-Known Loophole Will Allow the Richest
Exiles to Cash In, WASH. POST, Mar. 3, 1996, at C1, C4 (describing how Cuban exiles who
are now U.S. citizens are allowed to sue under Helms-Burton and explaining the prefer-
ence for settlement of Title tII lawsuits will favor those with the largest claims).
18. See § 302(a)(1), 110 Stat. at 815; H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-468, at 57 (1996), re-
priited in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 527, 572 (discussing the applicability of Title Itt). In re-
sponse to Castro's confiscations and expropriations, the U.S. Treasury Department issued
the Cuban Assets Control regulations (CACR) pursuant to the Trading with the Enemy
Act of 1917, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1-44 (1994). See 31 C.F.R. 515.101 to 901 (1996). The Trading
with the Enemy Act gave the President "broad authority to impose comprehensive embar-
goes on foreign countries as one means of dealing with both peacetime emergencies and
times of war." Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 225-26 (1984). Under the CACR, all transac-
tions in property that Cuba or any Cuban national had "any interest of any nature whatso-
ever" were prohibited. 31 C.F.R. § 515.201(b). The CACR contained one exception to the
Cuban embargo, allowing licensing for specified transactions involving U.S.-owned or con-
trolled firms operating in third countries (i.e., foreign subsidiaries of a U.S. parent corpora-
tion). See id.
In 1992, in an effort to pressure further the Castro regime, Congress passed the Cuban
Democracy Act, which nullified this exception and strictly prohibited U.S.-owned or con-
trolled firms operating overseas from transacting in any business related to Cuba. See 22
U.S.C. § 6005 (1994); see also 31 C.F.R. § 515.559 (implementing the closure of the licens-
ing exception). For a thorough examination of the legal and economic responses of the
United States to the Castro regime, see UNITED STATES ECONOMIC MEASURES AGAINST
CUBA: PROCEEDINGS IN THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW ISSUES 85-126
(Michael Krinsky & David Golove, eds. 1993).
19. See EU Protests Helms-Burton Law, Asks U.S. to Delay Implementation, 13 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 17, at 682-83 (Apr. 24, 1996) (discussing the European Union's
submission of a formal protest to the Clinton Administration); EU Urges European Firms
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tion contend that it violates numerous precepts of international law.2"
Arguing that Helms-Burton violates international law, however, would
be a needless expenditure of energy for a foreign defendant in a United
States court2' because the congressional intent for the expansive extrater-
to Ignore Threat of U.S. Sanctions for Cuba Trade, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 28, at
1128 (July 10, 1996) (examining the European Union's campaign to encourage European
firms to defy the Helms-Burton Act); U.S. Info. Agency, U.S. Sanctions Against Cuba:
'Beating a Dead Horse?' (Apr. 1, 1996) (summarizing the reactions of 25 countries to the
enactment of Helms-Burton).
The countries that immediately denounced the Helms-Burton Act and questioned its
extraterritorial reach included the "Rio Group" (most Latin American countries), as well
as the European Union, India, Japan, Jamaica, Madagascar, Switzerland, Norway, Trinidad
and Tobago, Sri Lanka, and Iceland. See Cuba Renews WTO Attack on U.S. Bill Aimed at
Curbing Foreign Investment, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 16, at 647-48 (Apr. 17, 1996)
(discussing Cuba's efforts at the World Trade Organization to attack Helms-Burton and
garner support from other nations); see also Central American Leaders Back Canada in
Opposition to Helms-Burton Cuba Law, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 21, at 841 (May 22,
1996) (reporting that Nicaragua, Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador, Costa Rica, and Be-
lize offered some support to Canada in its opposition to Helms-Burton); U.S. Info. Agency,
U.S.-Cuba Tensions: Unhappiness From Allies About Helms-Burton (Mar. 6, 1996) (report-
ing on Latin American criticisms of Helms-Burton).
20. See Seymour J. Rubin, Organization of American States: Inter-American Juridical
Committee Opinion Examining the U.S. Helms-Burton Act, 35 I.L.M. 1322, 1334 (1996)
(concluding that the Helms-Burton Act does not conform with international law); Euro-
pean Commission Calls Cuba Bill 'Clear' Violation of International Law, 13 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) No. 10, at 368 (Mar. 6, 1996) (same).
Besides violating international law, both Canada and Mexico maintain that the Helms-
Burton Act also violates the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and have
initiated a complaint, pursuant to dispute settlement mechanisms under Chapter 20 of
NAFTA. See NAFTA Designates Confer on Complaint Against Helms-Burton Under
Chapter 20, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 27, at 1093-94 (July 3, 1996); see also H. Scott
Fairley, Does the Helms-Burton Act Violate International Law: An Argument in the Affirm-
ative (June 24, 1996) (text of remarks for presentation at the American Conference Insti-
tute Program, "Beyond Cuba: U.S. International Business Restrictions ... Compliance
with Libertad and Other Controls .. "). But see Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Western Hemisphere and Peace Corps Affairs of the
Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 104th Cong. 184 (1995) (statement of Brice M. Clag-
ett, Partner, Covington & Burling) (arguing the United States has a right under interna-
tional law to protect the property of its citizens and to advance significant national security
interests through Helms-Burton, examining the "substantial effect" jurisdiction of interna-
tional law, and other legal principles, and concluding Helms-Burton is valid under interna-
tional law )- Brice M. Clagett, Title III of the Helms-Burton Act Is Consistent with
International Law, 90 AM. J. Ir'L L. 434, 434-40 (1996) (same).
21. See United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 248 n.1 (9th Cir. 1990) ("International
law principles, standing on their own, do not create substantive rights or affirmative de-
fenses for litigants in United States courts."); id. at 248 (recognizing only two restrictions
upon the extraterritorial reach of congressional legislation: (1) clear intent to give the law
extraterritorial effect; and, (2) "that application of the acts in question [do] not violate the
due process clause of the fifth amendment.") (citations omitted); see also Chua Han Mow
v. United States, 730 F.2d 1308, 1312 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that extraterritorial applica-
tion of a statute is justified by objective territorial and protective international law princi-
ples, and thus, is constitutional); United States v. King, 552 F.2d 833, 851-52 (9th Cir. 1973)
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ritorial reach of Helms-Burton could not have been more explicit."2 Nev-
ertheless, the extraterritorial application of Helms-Burton must comply
with constitutional due process requirements for United States courts to
exercise personal jurisdiction 3 over foreign defendants.2 4
President Clinton has suspended enforcement of Title III until July 16,
1997 and has signalled his intent to continue to suspend enforcement of
Title III for the foreseeable future.2 5 Nevertheless, Title III is significant
because Congress and the President enacted a law that arguably extends
civil liability to foreign individuals and corporations having no connec-
tions to the United States. 6 The idea that this kind of legislation could
be enacted, let alone enforced, is cause for concern because it signals that
Congress and the President are moving to enact increasingly bold extra-
territorial measures as foreign policy tools. 27
(upholding the extraterritorial application of federal law based on the territorial principle);
United States v. Cotten, 471 F.2d 744, 749 (9th Cir. 1976) (applying the territorial principle
to explain the validity in applying a statute extraterritorially).
22. See § 4(8), 110 Stat. at 790 ("The term 'foreign national' means (A) an alien; or
(B) any corporation, trust, partnership, or other juridical entity not organized under the
laws of the United States, or of any State, the District of Columbia, or any commonwealth,
territory, or possession of the United States."); §4(11), 110 Stat. at 790 ("The term 'person'
means any person or entity, including any agency or instrumentality of a foreign state.");
§ 301(10), 110 Stat. at 815 ("The United States Government has an obligation to its citizens
to provide protection against wrongful confiscations by foreign nations and their citizens,
including the provision of private remedies.").
23.. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1144 (6th ed. 1990) (defining personal jurisdiction
as "[lthe power of a court over the person of a defendant").
24. See infra notes 105-29 and accompanying text (examining the due process protec-
tions afforded foreign defendants under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
in U.S. federal courts).
Helms-Burton also raises serious separation of powers issues related to the executive
and legislative branches. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Congress and Cuba: The Helms-Bur-
ton Act, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 419, 427-30 (1996) (addressing the limits Helms-Burton places
upon the foreign affairs powers of the executive branch). This Comment will focus solely
on the due process issues raised by the Act and will not address the constitutional separa-
tion of powers issues.
25. See Thomas W. Lippman, Clinton Suspends Provisions of Law That Targets Cuba;
Move Defuses Spat with Major U.S. Allies, WASH. POST, Jan. 4, 1997, at Al.
Under section 306(b) of the Act, the president has the authority to suspend Title IIl for
six month increments. See § 306(b), 110 Stat. at 821. To suspend Title III, the President
must make a showing that a "suspension is necessary to the national interests of the United
States and will expedite a transition to democracy in Cuba." Id.; see also Department of
Justice, Summary of the Provisions of Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Soli-
darity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, 61 Fed. Reg. 24,955, 24,957 (1996) (explaining the six
month suspension mechanism).
26. See infra notes 158-69 and ac.companying text (explaining the expansive extraterri-
torial reach of the Act).
27. See supra note 13 (discussing examples of recent U.S. extraterritorial legislation).
Extraterritoriality Concerns Re Helms-Burton
This Comment examines the potential constitutional limitations of the
Helms-Burton Act. Specifically, this Comment provides a practical anal-
ysis of the due process issues raised by the application of Title III of
Helms-Burton upon foreign defendants and suggests a different analytical
framework to be used in determining the limitations of overly broad ex-
traterritorial federal legislation. Part One will briefly examine the pur-
poses of the Helms-Burton Act and provide an overview of the provisions
of Title III. Part Two will examine the evolution of the legal standards
United States courts developed to address jurisdictional and due process
issues raised by the extraterritorial application of United States law. Fo-
cusing on the complications created by the Act's overly broad language,
Part Three analyzes the constitutional limitations on the extraterritorial
application of Helms-Burton to foreign defendants. In Part Four, this
Comment suggests that United States courts should rigorously employ
existing United States due process and jurisdictional principles, as op-
posed to international law principles, to determine the limitations on
overly broad extraterritorial federal legislation.
This Comment suggests that courts may use international comity con-
siderations when defining the boundaries of intended extraterritorial ju-
risdiction. As a threshold determination, United States courts should
weigh international comity concerns within the framework of a new ef-
fects analysis to determine whether the exercise of extraterritorial subject
matter jurisdiction is valid, even when congressional intent for extraterri-
torial application is clear. Alternatively, international comity considera-
tions should be addressed within a court's personal jurisdiction analysis.
This Comment concludes that if Title III of Helms-Burton, or similar
overly broad extraterritorial legislation, is enforced, the United States
Supreme Court may have the opportunity to develop a coherent analyti-
cal framework to determine jurisdictional and due process limitations on
extraterritorial legislation.
I. BACKGROUND: THE CUBAN LIBERTY AND DEMOCRATIC
SOLIDARITY (LIBERTAD) ACa OF 1996-AN OVERVIEW
The Helms-Burton Act codifies the existing embargo of the United
States against Cuba,28 permits the revocation of visas of the executives of
28. See § 102, 110 Stat. at 792-94. Title I of Helms-Burton, entitled "Strengthening
International Sanctions Against the Castro Government," codifies and strengthens existing
executive orders and regulations related to the U.S. embargo against Cuba. See § 101-116,
110 Stat. at 791-805. Specifically, Title I reaffirms the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992,
which calls for the President to "encourage foreign countries to restrict trade and credit
relations with Cuba," and it also calls for full enforcement of the Cuban Assets Control
Regulations, codified at 31 C.F.R. 515. § 102(a)(1), (c), (h), 110 Stat. at 792, 794. Title I
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companies engaged in commercial activities that violate the Act,2 9 and
creates a process for the United States to provide economic aid to Cuba
once the Castro regime no longer governs and the country begins its tran-
sition into a democracy. 30 In enacting the Helms-Burton Act, Congress
sought to encourage the downfall of the Castro regime and to facilitate
Cuba's transition to democracy.31 A controversial endeavor, Helms-Bur-
ton languished in Congress for over a year and a half,32 until Cuban mili-
also amends the Trading with the Enemy Act to allow the Secretary of the Treasury to
impose civil penalties, not to exceed $50,000, "on any person who violates any license,
order, rule, or regulation issued in compliance with the provisions of this Act."
§ 102(d)(1), 110 Stat. at 793. Section 103 of Title I prohibits U.S. firms, U.S. nationals, and
permanent resident aliens from knowingly extending any loan or other type of financing to
any person for the purpose of directly or indirectly financing transactions involving confis-
cated property that is subject to a claim of ownership by a U.S. national. See § 103(a), 110
Stat. at 794. Title I also requires the President to submit a report on foreign nations' com-
merce with and assistance to Cuba. See § 108, 110 Stat. at 798-99.
Title It, entitled "Assistance to a Free and Independent Cuba," restricts the President
and executive branch from circumventing the Act's provisions through executive orders or
other means available to the executive branch. Specifically, Title II denies all members of
the executive branch the power to change or lift the embargo by allowing Congress to
enact a joint resolution to invalidate any such executive act. See § 204(e), 110 Stat. 794,
810-11.
29. See § 401(a)(3), 110 Stat. at 822. Title IV of Helms-Burton, entitled "Exclusion of
Certain Aliens," also allows the State Department to deny U.S. visas to any person that
traffics in expropriated property. See id. This exclusion extends to the alien's spouse and
minor children. See § 401(a)(4). For enforcement guidance, see Department of State,
Guidelines Implementing Title IV of the Cuban Liberty and Solidarity Act, 61 Fed. Reg.
30,655, 30,655 to 30,656 (1996).
The State Department began to enforce the provisions of Title IV immediately after
enactment, and has denied visas and entry into the United States to Mexican and Canadian
executives and their families. See Mexican Firm Grupo Domos Found in Violation of
Helms-Burton, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 34, at 1346 (Aug. 21, 1996). Grupo Domos,
a Mexican telecommunications company, and Sherritt International Corp., a Canadian
mining company, were both found to be trafficking in expropriated U.S. property in Cuba.
See id. Several of these companies' upper level executives, and their immediate families,
were denied visas and entry into the United States. See id.; see also 4 Executives Banned
From U.S., WASH. POST, Mar. 15, 1997, at All(reporting four executives of Sherritt Inter-
national Corp. were banned because of their Canadian company's violations of Helms-
Burton); Carla Anne Robbins & Jose de Cordoba, Sherrit Officials to Be Barred From
U.S., WALL ST. J., July 11, 1996, at All (reporting seven Canadian officials from Sherritt
International Corp. were barred entry into the United States).
30. See §§ 201-07, 110 Stat. at 805-14. Title II allows the President to terminate the
economic embargo against Cuba if Cuba changes to a democratically-elected government.
See § 204(a), 110 Stat. at 810. Title II also permits the President to coordinate and provide
economic assistance to the Cuban people to facilitate Cuba's transition into a democracy.
See § 202, 110 Stat. at 806-808.
31. See § 3, 110 Stat. at 788-89; see also H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-468, at 43 (1996),
reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 527, 558 (stating the purpose of the act was to seek interna-
tional sanctions against Castro's regime and to plan for a transition to democracy).
32. Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina introduced legislation on February 9, 1995,
designed to strengthen the embargo against Cuba and to allow U.S. nationals with claims
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tary aircraft shot down two United States civilian aircraft on February 23,
1996.33 President Clinton shortly thereafter signed the Helms-Burton
Act into law on March 12, 1996.34
In its findings, Congress articulated six specific reasons for enacting
Helms-Burton: (1) helping the Cuban people attain freedom and prosper-
ity, (2) encouraging international sanctions against Castro's regime, (3)
protecting United States national security against terrorism sponsored by
Castro, (4) facilitating the emergence of a democratic Cuba, (5) protect-
ing American citizens from the confiscation and "trafficking" of property
that was expropriated by the Cuban government after January 1, 1959,
and, (6) encouraging legitimate democratic elections.35 Title III of the
Helms-Burton Act seeks to further restrict the flow of foreign investment
capital into Cuba, because foreign capital sustains Cuba's abysmal econ-
omy and, in turn, sustains Fidel Castro's regime.36 Entitled "Protection
of Property Rights of United States Nationals," Title III establishes a pri-
of property confiscated by the Cuban government to sue any person or foreign company
trafficking in the property for damages in U.S. district courts. See S. 381, 104th Cong. § 3
(1995). Representative Dan Burton introduced similar legislation on February 14, 1995.
See H.R. 927, 104th Cong. (1995). The House of Representatives passed its version of the
bill on September 21, 1995. See 141 CONG. REC. H1751 (daily ed. Feb. 14, 1995). The
Senate passed its version on October 19, 1995. See 141 CONG. REC. S2399 (daily ed. Feb. 9,
1995). Due to discrepancies between the two versions, the bills were sent to a Conference
Committee comprised of members of both the House and Senate in an effort to create a
mutually acceptable piece of legislation. The Conference Committee did not issue its
report until March 1, 1996. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-468, reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 558.
33. See § 116, 110 Stat. at 803-05 (condemning the Castro regime's act of terrorisMn in
shooting down the planes); see also Jose De Cordoba, The Question: Why Did Castro Do
It?, WALL ST. J., Feb. 27, 1996, at A19 (reporting on the damage to United States-Cuban
relations caused by the destruction of the planes); Mark A.A. Warner, Cutting Ourselves
on Cuban Policy, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 11, 1996, at 26-27 (reporting on the Helms-Burton
legislation).
34. See President Signs Cuba Sanctions Bill After It Passes House by Big Margin, 13
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 11, at 421-23 (Mar. 13, 1996).
Prior to the shooting down of the two civilian planes, President Clinton vigorously op-
posed the private right of action granted in Title III of the Helms-Burton Act. The White
House supported a Democrat filibuster against the legislation the year before. See Clinton
Says He Will Try To Reach Compromise On Helms-Burton Cuba Bill, 13 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) No. 9, at 332 (Feb. 28, 1996). Secretary of State Warren Christopher recommended
vetoing the Helms-Burton Act in 1995 because the foreign investment provision would
have caused problems with allies and been hard to justify under international law. See id.
35. See § 3, 110 Stat. at 788-89.
36. See § 301(6), 110 Stat. at 814. Section 301(6) of Title Ill states: "This 'trafficking'
in confiscated property provides badly needed financial benefit, including hard currency,
oil, and productive investment and expertise, to the current Cuban Government and thus
undermines the foreign policy of the United States." Id.; see also H.R. CONF. REP. No.
104-468, at 58, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 573 (stating the provision's purpose is to
discourage trafficking and deny Castro funds).
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vate right of action for United States citizens, in United States federal
district courts, against all persons that knowingly and intentionally en-
gage in business transactions involving American-owned property that
the Castro regime confiscated and nationalized.37 This private right of
action may be brought against individuals, businesses, foreign states, and
instrumentalities of foreign states.38
The sweeping language of the Helms-Burton Act is designed to deter
foreign investment in, and foreign commerce with, Cuba.39 While "traf-
ficking" traditionally connotates illegal drug activity or contraband smug-
gling, the Helms-Burton Act's definition of "trafficking" refers to regular
37. See §§ 301-306, 110 Stat. at 814-22. See also H.R. CONF. REP. No. at 57-66, re-
printed in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 572-81 (discussing the provisions of Title II1). For a com-
plete history of Cuba's systematic expropriation of private property, see Matias F.
Travieso-Diaz, Some Legal and Practical Issues in the Resolution of Cuban Nationals' Ex-
propriation Claims Against Cuba, 16 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 217, 219-24 (1995).
38. See § 302, 110 Stat. at 815-17. Under Title III, U.S. nationals may sue for money
damages in the amount equal to or greater than their certified claim with the Foreign
Claims Settlement Commission, plus interest, court costs and reasonable attorneys' fees.
See § 302(a)(1), 110 Stat. at 815. There are two tiers of potential plaintiffs that may sue for
damages. Title III gives preference to U.S. nationals that have a pre-existing certified
claim with the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission by giving them a presumptive re-
covery and entitling them to treble damages. See § 302 (a)(2),(3), 110 Stat. at 815. The
second tier of plaintiffs are U.S. nationals without certified claims who must wait for two
years from the enactment of Helms-Burton before they can pursue a lawsuit under Title
III. See § 302(a)(5), 110 Stat. at 816-17.
The Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the United States (FCSC) was created to
handle claims by U.S. citizens that had property or related interests expropriated by a
foreign government. See 22 U.S.C. § 1623 (1994). In 1964, Congress amended the Foreign
Claims Settlement Act to establish a Cuban Claims Program, under which the FCSC was
given the authority to determine and certify the validity and amount of claims by U.S.
nationals against the Government of Cuba for the taking of their property. See § 1643.
For a brief history of the response of the United States to Cuba's expropriations and
possible practical remedies available for U.S. nationals, see Travieso-Diaz, supra note 16,
at 660-64.
39. See § 301(11), 110 Stat. at 815; Lowenfeld, supra note 24, at 425; see also supra
note 36 and accompanying text (discussing the ultimate purpose behind the deterrence of
foreign investment in Cuba).
Even though the provisions of Title III have been suspended by President Clinton,
Helms-Burton has still succeeded in deterring foreign investment in Cuba. See Paul Blus-
tein, Mexican Firm Quits Cuba in Face of U. S. Sanctions, WASH. POST, May 30, 1996, at
D9, 11 (reporting that a Mexican cement company stopped conducting business in Cuba
because of the risk of liability under Helms-Burton); Gordon Cramb & Pascal Fletcher, US
Law on Investment in Cuba Forces ING Out of Sugar, FIN. TIMES, July 5, 1996, at 22 (re-
porting that ING, a Dutch banking group that financed the Cuban sugar industry, chose
not to renew its $30 million in loans to the industry in reaction to Helms-Burton); Douglas
Farah, Cubans Blame Slowdown on Helms-Burton Act, WASH. POST, Jan. 25, 1997, at A16
("Cuban officials now concede that the Helms-Burton Act ... has hurt the battered Cuban
economy and slowed its growth."). But see Pascal Fletcher, UK-Cuba Trade Rising Despite
Helms-Burton Law, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1996 at 6 (reporting a 92% increase in British
exports to Cuba from 1995 to 1996).
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international commercial activities. 40 The term "traffics" is so broadly
defined 41 that nearly any business transaction that in any way involves
expropriated United States property in Cuba could arguably be deemed a
Title III trafficking violation.42
The trafficking definition provides the Helms-Burton Act with a poten-
tially unlimited extraterritorial reach.43 The term may be interpreted to
cover foreign nationals or businesses that engage in international com-
mercial transactions that relate directly or tangentially to confiscated
40. See Lowenfeld, supra note 24, at 425-26 (discussing the traditional and new mean-
ing of "trafficking"); Kees Jan Kuilwijk, Restrictions Hit Traders, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1996,
at 19 (examining the implications of Helms-Burton upon non-U.S. companies engaging in
business transactions in Cuba or merely engaging in business with other companies that are
involved in Cuba). But see Claggett, supra note 20, at 438 (arguing that Castro's confisca-
tion of property was illegal under international law).
41. See § 4(13)(A), 110 Stat. at 790-91. "Traffics" applies to a person who knowingly
and intentionally:
(i) sells, transfers, distributes, dispenses, brokers, manages, or otherwise dis-
poses of confiscated property, or purchases, leases, receives, possesses, obtains
control of, manages, uses, or otherwise acquires or holds an interest in confiscated
property,
(ii) engages in a commercial activity using or otherwise benefiting from confis-
cated property, or
(iii) causes, directs, participates in, or profits from, trafficking ... by another
person, or otherwise engages in trafficking ... through another person without
the authorization of any United States national who holds a claim to the property.
Id.
42. See infra notes 157-69 and accompanying text (explaining the broad range of po-
tential trafficking violations under Title III).
There are limited exclusions from the trafficking definition:
(i) the delivery of international telecommunication signals to Cuba;
(ii) the trading or holding of securities publicly traded or held, unless the trad-
ing is with or by a person determined by the Secretary of the Treasury to be a
specially designated national;
(iii) transactions and uses of property incident to lawful travel to Cuba, to the
extent that such transactions and uses of property are necessary to the conduct of
such travel; or
(iv) transactions and uses of property by a person who is both a citizen of Cuba
and a resident of Cuba, and who is not an official of the Cuban Government or
the ruling political party in Cuba.
§ 4(13)(B), 110 Stat. at 790-91.
43. See infra notes 158-69 and accompanying text (providing examples of Title III traf-
ficking violations). For a general discussion on interpretations of "trafficking," see Fairley,
supra note 20, at 8-9 (examining the interpretation, or lack thereof, of "trafficking" in the
context of the implementation and enforcement of Title III); see also Department of State,
Guidelines Implementing Title IV of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, 61
Fed. Reg. 30,655 (1996) (providing the State Department's interpretation of trafficking
within the context of the enforcement of Title IV).
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property.44 In addition, any foreign corporate parent, subsidiary, or affili-
ate that profits from such trafficking may also be found liable under Title
1II. 45 Trafficking violations may also extend liability to foreign entities
financing the Cuban sugar industry, as well as United States entities that
receive proceeds from trafficking activities, such as banks, commodity
traders, or other financial institutions.46 For example, if a United States
bank receives a loan payment derived from profits gained by a foreign
company engaged in trafficking activities, the United States bank also
may be subject to a suit under Title II1.4  Such broad interpretations of
44. See Department of State, Guidelines Implementing Title IV of the Cuban Liberty
and Democratic Solidarity Act, 61 Fed. Reg. 30,655; Department of Justice, Summary of
the Provisions of Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD)
Act of 1996, 61 Fed. Reg. 24,955.
The European Union (EU) has vigorously protested the extraterritorial reach of Helms-
Burton to include indirect imports as trafficking violations under Title 111. See EU For-
mally Requests WTO Talks Over Cuba Sanctions Legislation, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
No. 19, at 762 (May 8, 1996) [hereinafter EU Requests WTO Talks] (discussing the EU's
concern towards Helms-Burton's extraterritorial reach to indirect sugar imports, as well as
direct exports of products that include sugar imported to the EU from Cuba).
45. See § 4(13)(A), 110 Stat. at 791. See generally Note, Extraterritorial Subsidiary
Jurisdiction, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 71, 71-77 (1987) (examining U.S. courts' asser-
tion of personal jurisdiction over foreign subsidiaries through parent companies) [hereinaf-
ter Extraterritorial Subsidiary]. Attorneys representing potential U.S. plaintiffs under Title
II have already targeted U.S. subsidiaries as possible defendants. For example, former
American owners of a Cuban tobacco plantation have targeted a U.S. subsidiary of British-
American Tobacco (BAT), which manufactures Lucky Strike cigarettes in Kentucky. See
Desloge, supra note 17, at C4. BAT has a joint venture with a Brazilian company in Cuba
to grow tobacco on land expropriated from U.S. nationals. See id.
46. See Pascal Fletcher, Cuban Sugar's Foreign Sweetner: European Finance Lifts an
Industry Starved of Capital for Four Years, FIN. TIMES, July 24, 1996, at 22 (reporting on
Helms-Burton's effect on foreign financing of the Cuban sugar industry).
47. See Matias F. Travieso-Diaz, Why Lawyers Love the Cuba Bill, J. COMM., Mar. 18,
1996, at 6A.
In the cases where certified claims involve several million dollars, U.S. nationals and
corporations bringing law suits under Title III most likely will spark complex, multi-party
litigation. See Desloge, supra note 17, at C4. The following are a few of the major U.S.
companies with certified claims against Cuba: Coca-Cola ($27.5 million), General Dynam-
ics ($10.4 million), ITT ($47.6 million), Standard Oil ($71.6 million), and Texaco ($50.1
million). See Seeking Settlements From Cuba, USA TODAY, July 15, 1996, at 3B. Under
Title Ii, certified claimants are entitled to treble damages. See § 302 (a)(3)(C)(ii), 110
Stat. at 816. In an effort to maximize their recovery efforts, these claimants probably will
sue as many potential traffickers directly and indirectly related to their confiscated Cuban
property as possible. See Noreen Marcus, Helms-Burton Sparks Suits: Attorneys Capitalize
on Anti-Castro Law, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 8, 1996, at 2 (reporting on plaintiffs preparing to
sue under Helms-Burton); see also Desloge, supra note 17 at C4 (reporting on several
potential Helms-Burton lawsuits).
Advocates of the Helms-Burton Act attempt to justify the potential legal complications
by emphasizing that the Act's ultimate goal is deterrence, not the promotion of complex
litigation. However, if Congress is willing to "talk the talk" and threaten foreign busi-
nesses with private causes of action, Congress must also be prepared to "walk the walk"
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Title III implicate due process issues related to the exercise of personal
jurisdiction by United States courts over foreign, as well as American,
defendants sued under its provisions.48 Undoubtedly, due process and
jurisdictional issues will be a focal point for many defendants sued under
Title Ill.4 9
and accept the practical domestic legal repercussions if Title IIl, or similar overly broad
extraterritorial legislation, is enforced.
48. See infra notes 104-30 and accompanying text (discussing the due process require-
ments and protections afforded foreign defendants haled into U.S. courts under extraterri-
torial U.S. law).
49. See infra notes 158-69 and accompanying text (discussing potential Helms-Burton
lawsuits).
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) is a federal long-arm statute authorizing
U.S. courts to exercise subject matter and personal jurisdiction over suits arising under
U.S. relations with other countries. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a), 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-11
(1994). The commercial activities exception of the FSIA and Title III of Helms-Burton
may potentially have many parallels in regard to litigation arising from their respective
implementation. The FSIA was a very controversial extraterritorial application of U.S.
law, heavily contested by the international community and litigated in U.S. courts. See
Victoria A. Carter, Note, God Save the King: Unconstitutional Assertions of Personal Juris-
diction over Foreign States in U. S. Courts, 82 VA. L. REV. 357, 359-66 (1996) (examining
the exercise of personal jurisdiction and possible constitutional law violations under the
FSIA). The FSIA codifies the "restrictive theory" of sovereign immunity. See Texas Trad-
ing & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 310 (2d Cir. 1981); see
also Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, app.2 at 711 (1976)
(noting that the United States adopted the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity under
which commercial or proprietary actions of foreign governments are not protected);
Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc. v. Committee of Receivers for A.W. Galadari, 810
F. Supp. 1375, 1378-79 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (discussing the adoption and application of the
restrictive theory of sovereign immunity).
Under the FSIA, a foreign state or its instrumentalities, such as a bank or government-
owned corporation, are immune from the exercise of personal jurisdiction in U.S. courts,
unless one of the specific exceptions in the FSIA is applicable or the foreign sovereign
consents to jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (1)-(6). Title III of Helms-Burton applies
to foreign corporations trafficking confiscated U.S. property. See § 302(a)(1), 110 Stat. at
815. In an important similarity to the FSIA, most business ventures in Cuba will probably
entail a joint venture between a foreign corporation and the Cuban government. See Ron
First, Comment, Cuba's Changing Foreign Investment Climate: Castro's Attempt to Lure
Foreign Investors, 9 TRANSNAT'L L. 295, 300-30 (1996) (explaining Cuba's new foreign in-
vestment law). Furthermore, Helms-Burton explicitly denies the use of the Act of State
doctrine as a defense for foreign sovereign defendants. See § 302(a)(6), 110 Stat. at 817.
The Act of State doctrine is defined as "the courts of one country will not sit in judgment
of the acts of the government of another done within its own territory." See Underhill v.
Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
Under the "commercial activities" exception of the FSIA, sovereign immunity does not
apply when the foreign entity engages in "(1) commercial activity in the U.S.; (2) an act
performed in the U.S. in connection with commercial activity occurring elsewhere; or (3)
an act outside the territory of the U.S. in connection with commercial activity elsewhere
that causes a direct effect in the U.S." 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2); see also Richard Wydeven,
Note, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976: A Contemporary Look at Jurisdiction
Under the Commercial Activity Exception, 13 REV. LITNG. 143, 146-68 (1993) (examining
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II. THE LEGAL PRINCIPLES ADDRESSING THE LIMITATIONS ON THE
EXERCISE OF EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION
For a valid exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction,5" a United States
court must have both subject matter jurisdiction over the controversy5'
the three clauses of the commercial activity exception and the determination of the valid
exercise of personal jurisdiction upon foreign defendants whose conduct has a direct effect
upon the U.S.). In Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607 (1992), the
Supreme Court defined "commercial activity" as either a regular course of commercial
conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act. See id. at 612-14.
Because the commercial activities exception to the FSIA does not mention minimum
contacts requirements, foreign defendants sought dismissal of lawsuits on the grounds of
lack of jurisdiction of the U.S. courts to hear the claim. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2);
Carter, supra, at 364-65 (discussing the due process implications of FSIA's jurisdictional
grant). The Helms-Burton legislation purposefully avoids any mention of jurisdictional
principles; relying upon existing jurisdictional jurisprudence for lawsuits brought under Ti-
tle Ill. See Cuba Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act: Hearings Before the Senate Sub-
comm. on Western Hemisphere and Peace Corps Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 104th Cong. 104-212 (1995) (statement of Monroe Leigh, Steptoe & Johnson)
("[Helms-Burton] does not create any new standard for the exercise of personal jurisdic-
tion over individuals or corporations. Instead, the Act is silent on this subject, relying on
the standards established by the Supreme Court in cases such as International Shoe and
Worldwide Volkswagen.").
The Supreme Court recognized that lawsuits brought under the "direct effect" clause of
the FSIA commercial activity exception may not always satisfy due process requirements
for personal jurisdiction. See Weltover, 504 U.S. at 619 (addressing the Fifth Amendment
requirements); see also Texas Trading, 647 F.2d at 313-15 (addressing the Constitutional
constraints on jurisdiction under the FSIA); Walpex Trading Co. v. Yacimintos Petroliferos
Fiscales Bolivanos, 712 F. Supp. 383, 390 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) ("Congress did not have the
authority to override the constitutional due process constraints underlying personal juris-
diction when it drafted the FSIA."). It follows that lawsuits brought under Title III of
Helms-Burton may also be open for challenge on jurisdictional due process grounds.
50. BLACK'S LAW DIcIONARY 588 (6th ed. 1990) (defining extraterritorial jurisdiction
as "U]uridical power which extends beyond the physical limits of a particular state or coun-
try" and defining extraterritoriality as "[tihe extraterritorial operation of laws; that is, their
operations upon persons.., existing beyond the limits of the enacting state or nation, but
still amenable to its laws").
51. See Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456
U.S. 694, 701 (1982) ("The validity of an order of a federal court depends upon that court's
having jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the parties."); BLACK'S LAW DICTiON-
ARY 1425 (6th ed. 1990) (defining subject matter jurisdiction as the court's "power to deal
with the general subject involved in the action"); see also Joelson, supra note 5, at 143-51
(1994) (examining federal subject matter jurisdiction in U.S. courts).
It is well established that legislation may be applied to foreign conduct abroad. See
EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) ("Congress has the authority to
enforce its laws beyond the territorial boundaries of the United States."); United States v.
Medjuck, 48 F.3d 1107, 1110-11 (9th Cir. 1995) ("There is generally no constitutional bar to
such extraterritorial application of domestic penal laws. We require only that Congres-
sional intent of extraterritorial scope be clear and the application of the statue to the acts
in question not violate the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment."); see also Born,
supra note 9, at 2-7 (reviewing the evolution of extraterritorial U.S. law in state and federal
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and personal jurisdiction over the defendant.52 The requirement of per-
sonal jurisdiction 53 stems from the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment54 and applies to foreign defendants haled into a United
States court under extraterritorial federal legislation.55 The legal stan-
courts and suggesting that the territorial presumption that attaches to legislation should be
abandoned entirely).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure prescribe the requirements for effecting service of
a summons to establish personal jurisdiction over any foreign or nonresident defendant.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k). In determining whether service is effective to exercise personal
jurisdiction, the federal court examines the defendants' contacts with the United States as a
whole, instead of their contacts within the particular territorial boundaries of the court's
forum. See id. Section 2 of Rule 4 states:
If the exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with the Constitution and laws of the
United States, serving a summons or filing a waiver of service is also effective,
with respect to claims arising under federal law, to establish personal jurisdiction
over the person of any defendant who is not subject to the jurisdiction of the
courts of general jurisdiction of any state.
Id.; see also Texas Trading, 647 F.2d at 308 (explaining that statutory personal jurisdiction,
such as service of process under Rule 4(k) referenced in the FSIA, still requires due pro-
cess scrutiny); Kent Sinclair, Service of Process: Amended Rule 4 and the Presumption of
Jurisdiction, 14 REV. LIriG. 159, 188-91 (1994) (explaining the provisions and application
of Rule 4(k)); Holly A. Ellencrig, Comment, Expanding Personal Jurisdiction Over Foreign
Defendants: A Response to Omni Capital International v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 24 CAL. W.
INT'L L.J. 363, 370-75 (1994) (examining Federal Rule 4(k) and the due process issues that
arise from its application).
52. The requirement for personal jurisdiction is derived from the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. See Insurance Corp. of Ireland, 456 U.S. at 702;
Foster-Miller, Inc. v. Babcock & Wilcox Canada, 46 F.3d 138, 143 (1st Cir. 1995) ("Per-
sonal jurisdiction implicates the power of a court over a defendant.").
53. See Friedrich K. Juenger, American Jurisdiction: A Story of Comparative Neglect,
65 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 7-10 (1993) (examining the origins of the due process doctrine in
relation to extraterritorial assertions of jurisdiction); Russell J. Weintraub, A Map Out of
the Personal Jurisdiction Labyrinth, 28 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 531, 534-40, 545-58 (1995) (ex-
plaining personal jurisdiction jurisprudence as developed by the Supreme Court and sug-
gesting alternative approaches to eliminate the current reigning chaos of jurisdictional
legal principles and standards).
54. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. ("No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law."); see also Gary A. Haugen, Personal Jurisdiction
and Due Process Rights for Alien Defendants, 11 B.U. INT'L L.J. 109,111-14 (1993) (exam-
ining the Supreme Court's position that the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments protect foreign defendants from unreasonable assertions of jurisdiction by
U.S. courts).
55. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (holding that
due process requires that a nonresident defendant must have minimum contacts with the
forum so that assertion of jurisdiction does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice" (citing Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457,463 (1940))); Texas Trading, 647
F.2d at 307 (noting that congressional legislation attempting to link personal jurisdiction to
subject matter jurisdiction is limited by the Due Process Clause); see also Gary B. Born,
Reflections on Judicial Jurisdiction in International Cases, 17 GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 1, 5-
10 (1987) (examining U.S. state and federal courts' responses to jurisdictional challenges
by foreign defendants who argue for due process protection from the court's assertion of
personal jurisdiction); Brilmayer, supra note 8, at 14-16, 24-35 (examining the historical
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dard for the valid exercise of extraterritorial personal jurisdiction re-
quires that the foreign defendant have minimum contacts with the United
States forum so that maintaining the action "does not offend traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice. 5 6
A. The Test for Assertion of Extraterritorial Subject Matter Jurisdiction
To determine whether a United States court has jurisdiction over for-
eign, nonresident extraterritorial conduct, two inquiries are potentially
relevant. 7 First, a court must consider whether Congress intended the
and analytic development of due process issues raised by the assertion of extraterritorial
jurisdiction); Stephen Goldstein, Federalism and Substantive Due Process: A Comparative
and Historical Perspective on International Shoe and Its Progeny, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
965, 966-70 (1995) (tracing the historical evolution of due process requirements in personal
jurisdiction jurisprudence, and advocating the abandonment of federal subject jurisdiction
and the adoption of congressional legislation that allocates personal jurisdiction on the
state level based on other international law models); Sean K. Hornbeck, Comment, Trans-
national Litigation and Personal Jurisdiction Over Foreign Defendants, 59 ALB. L. REV.
1389, 1426-43 (1996) (examining jurisdictional problems in transnational litigation within
the United States).
56. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316; see also Linda J. Silberman, "Two Cheers" for
International Shoe (and None for Asahi): An Essay on the Fiftieth Anniversary of Interna-
tional Shoe, 28 U.C. DAViS L. REV. 755, 756-67 (1995) (comparing the constitutional ana-
lytic framework in International Shoe with the succeeding framework established by the
Supreme Court, and concluding that International Shoe was more practical in its applica-
tion than the succeeding legal standards).
For examples of extraterritorial application of U.S. subject matter jurisdiction to reach
U.S. citizens abroad, see Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 438-40 (1932) (upholding
the application of the Walsh Act's requirement that U.S. citizens abroad return to the U.S.
if required by court proceedings or other circumstances), and Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47, 53
n.1, 54-56 (1924) (applying federal income tax regulations to U.S. citizens living abroad).
57. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir.
1945) (reviewing congressional intent and constitutional limitations regarding foreign
nationals).
In the beginning of the twentieth century of the United States, the Supreme Court ap-
plied the "territorial principle," an international law concept, to its jurisdictional analysis.
See American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909) (declining to ex-
tend the Sherman Act outside the boundaries of U.S. territory). The territorial principle
mandated that U.S. law only apply within its borders. See id. at 355-57; Foley Bros., Inc. v.
Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 284-85 (1949) ("[Ljegislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent
appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States ... ").
The territorial principle is still recognized today. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499
U.S. 244, 248 (1991) ("We assume that Congress legislates against the backdrop of the
presumption against extraterritoriality.").
Early in American history, however, the Supreme Court still recognized that the Consti-
tution conferred upon Congress the power to enact extraterritorial legislation. Cf. United
States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat) 610, 630 (1818) ("The constitution having conferred on
congress the power of defining and punishing piracy, there can be no doubt of the right of
the legislature to enact laws punishing pirates, although they may be foreigners, and may
have committed no particular offence against the United States.").
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law to have an extraterritorial application.58 Second, a court may inquire
whether the Constitution, and in particular the Due Process Clause, per-
mits such an extension of United States law.59
1. The Intended Effects Test
With regard to the first inquiry, where congressional intent is not clear,
the courts have created a two-pronged test to determine whether a
United States court has subject matter jurisdiction over extraterritorial
conduct.6" Under this test, courts (1) examine whether there is a detri-
58. See Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 443 ("[W]e are concerned only with whether Congress
chose to attach liability to the conduct outside the United States of persons not in alle-
giance to it.").
As American international commercial activities expanded, it became apparent that
some activities occurring abroad could have a substantial effect within the borders of the
United States. See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222-23 (1957) (rec-
ognizing that advances in technology required changes in the law to adapt to a more
closely integrated nation and world); Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 620-23 (1927)
(discussing international recognition of extraterritorial jurisdiction); United States v. Bow-
man, 260 U.S. 94, 98-99 (1922) (recognizing that the government may enact extraterritorial
criminal statutes "to defend itself against obstruction, or fraud wherever perpetrated")
(emphasis added). Thereafter, Congress began enacting legislation that created subject
matter jurisdiction in U.S. courts for certain activities of foreign entities occurring abroad.
See Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 705 (1962) (find-
ing that liability could still be found notwithstanding American Banana in a private action
under U.S. antitrust laws, "[s]ince the activities of the defendants had an impact within the
United States and upon its foreign trade"); United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S.
268, 276 (1927) (concluding that extraterritorial application of the Sherman Antitrust Act
and Wilson Tariff Act was acceptable because of the negative impact of the foreign defend-
ants' intentional conduct, which occurred outside the territorial boundaries of the United
States, because the conduct had "forbidden results within the United States"). In addition,
U.S. courts began recognizing that some legislation applied to extraterritorial foreign con-
duct even if the statute did not expressly state an intent for an extraterritorial application.
See, e.g., Steele v. Bulva Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 286-87 (1952) (holding that the Lanham
Act, which governs patents and trademarks, applied extraterritorially); Ford, 273 U.S. at
620-21 (recognizing that foreign acts committed outside the United States that are in-
tended to have a detrimental effect within its borders should be brought within the jurisdic-
tion of the United States); United States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d 486, 493 (9th Cir. 1987)
("Where an attempted transaction is aimed at causing criminal acts within the United
States, there is a sufficient basis for the United States to exercise its jurisdiction to arrest
and try the offenders."); Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 641-43 (2d
Cir. 1956) (examining the extraterritorial reach of patent and trademark laws). See gener-
ally Born, supra note 9, at 39-55 (surveying the interpretation of the Sherman Act and the
application of the effects doctrine to determine extraterritorial jurisdiction for federal
trademark and patent laws, maritime legislation, securities laws, maritime legislation, and
criminal legislation).
59. See Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 443 ("[Tlhe only question open is whether Congress had the
intent to impose liability, and whether our own Constitution permitted it to do so ... ").
60. See id. at 443-44 (explaining the analytic framework, latter called the "effects test,"
for determining extraterritorial subject matter jurisdiction'when congressional intent is not
clear); see also Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 608-12 (9th Cir.
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mental effect within the United States, that (2) results directly from for-
eign activities that are intended to have a negative impact within the
United States. 61
The test to extend United States law to foreign conduct occurring
outside the territory of the United States was created in United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa).62 Signalling the beginning of modern
extraterritorial federal legislation, 63 Alcoa addressed whether the Sher-
1976) (discussing the Alcoa effects analysis). Courts created a "conduct test" to be used in
conjunction with the effects test in regard to international securities transactions. See
Tamari v. Bache & Co. (Lebanon) S.A.L., 730 F.2d 1103, 1107-08 (7th Cir. 1984) (applying
the "conducts" and "effects" tests to the Commodity Exchange Act to determine if Con-
gress intended for its extraterritorial application).
The effects test borrowed from international law the "Effects Doctrine," which recog-
nizes that any nation may impose liabilities for conduct outside its borders that has conse-
quences within the borders of that nation, and that a nation may impose liabilities upon a
person with no allegiance to that nation. 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW §§ 402-03, at 237-254 (1986) (recognizing the international effects doctrine as a valid
justification for conferring jurisdiction abroad).
The effects doctrine is referenced in Title III of Helms-Burton under the statement of
findings in section 301: "International law recognizes that a nation has the ability to pro-
vide for rules of law with respect to conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to
have substantial effect within its territory." Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
(LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-114, § 301(9), 110 Stat. 785, 815 (1996).
Many of the current legal principles and standards used to determine the extraterritorial
reach of U.S. laws were developed in antitrust cases dealing with extraterritoriality. See
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 (1993) ("[l~t is well established by
now that the Sherman Act applies to foreign conduct that was meant to produce and did in
fact produce some substantial effect in the United States."); Matsushita Elec. Indus. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 582 n.6 (1986) ("The Sherman Act does reach conduct
outside our borders, but only when the conduct has an effect on American Commerce."
(citing Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 704 (1962)));
see also Born, supra note 9, at 39-55 (surveying the interpretation of the extraterritorial
application of various federal statutes).
61. See Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 443-44 (providing the framework for determining whether
to apply U.S. antitrust laws extraterritorially); see also Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 796 (find-
ing the allegations in the case state the conduct was intended to affect the U.S. insurance
market).
62. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). In Alcoa, the Second Circuit sat as the court of last
resort because the Supreme Court could not muster a quorum thus its opinion was final.
See Gibney, supra note 8, at 298 n.4; see also James J. Friedberg, The Convergence of Law
in an Era of Political Integration: The Wood Pulp Case and the Alcoa Effects Doctrine, 52
U. Pin-. L. REV. 289, 324-27 (1991) (examining the complications created by a global econ-
omy and the U.S. courts' application of the effects doctrine to foreign violations of U.S.
trade laws); Edward L. Rholl, Inconsistent Application of the Extraterritorial Provisions of
the Sherman Act: A Judicial Response Based upon the Much Maligned "Effects" Test, 73
MARO. L. REV. 435, 441-51 (1990) (tracing the development of extraterritorial subject mat-
ter jurisdiction under the Sherman Act after the Alcoa decision).
63. See Born, supra note 9, at 32-37 (discussing decisions based on Alcoa).
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man Act64 and other United States antitrust laws65 applied to conduct
abroad even though the antitrust laws' provisions did not expressly pro-
vide for extraterritorial application.66 To determine the validity of the
extraterritorial application of United States antitrust laws, the Second
Circuit considered whether (1) Congress intended to impose liability; and
(2) the Constitution would permit such action.67
In Alcoa, the court focused on whether Congress intended an extrater-
ritorial extension of the Sherman Act, and did not address the constitu-
tional limitations of such an extension.68 Under the Alcoa effects test,
liability under United States antitrust laws could be found whenever (1)
intentional foreign conduct affects United States commerce; 69 and, (2)
such conduct results in a demonstrated actual or presumed anti-competi-
tive effect on United States markets." Following the Alcoa decision, the
64. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994).
65. See Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, 15 U.S.C. § 6a (1994);
Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1994); Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 45 (1994).
66. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 443.
67. See id.
68. See id. at 443-44. It is recognized that, historically, constitutional arguments have
rarely been advanced by foreign defendants objecting to the extraterritorial application of
U.S. law. See Brilmayer, supra note 8, at 25 ("[C]onstitutional arguments rarely have been
advanced in the briefs of parties resisting application of American law."). However, given
the trend of increasingly bold extraterritorial legislation promulgated by Congress and pro-
posed by the executive branch, these arguments have become more important to foreign
defendants haled into a U.S. forum. Due process defenses have been utilized most often in
litigation arising from the commercial activities exception of the FSIA. See Texas Trading
& Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 308 (2d Cir. 1981) ("[T]he
[FSIA] cannot create personal jurisdiction where the Constitution forbids it. Accordingly,
each finding of personal jurisdiction under the FSIA requires ... a due process scrutiny of
the court's power to exercise its authority over a particular defendant."); Drexel Burnham
Lambert Group, Inc. v. Committee of Receivers for A.W. Galadari, 810 F. Supp. 1375,
1388-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (examining the due process protections afforded foreign defend-
ants haled into U.S. court under the commercial activities exception to the FSIA); Walpex
Trading Co. v. Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales Bolivanos, 712 F. Supp. 383, 390-92
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (discussing the application of constitutional due process limits to the ex-
traterritorial application of the FSIA): Exchange Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. Empresa Min-
eral Del Centro Del Peru S.A., 595 F. Supp. 502, 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (rejecting the
assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction over the foreign defendants based on due process
grounds).
69. See Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 443. For an analysis of cases where courts attempt to define
and analyze the term "effect" within the context of a "direct effect" analysis, see Hadwin
A. Card, III, Note, Interpreting the Direct Effects Clause of the FSIA's Commercial Activity
Exception, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 91, 99-108 (1990) (examining a variety of interpretations
of the direct effects clause of the commercial activities exception to the FSIA).
70. See Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 443.
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Supreme Court endorsed the Second Circuit's effects test in American
Tobacco Co. v. United States.71
2. International Comity: The Addition of a Third Prong
Subsequent to the Alcoa and American Tobacco decisions, several
courts added a third prong to the effects test.72 In addition to considering
whether foreign conduct affects United States imports, exports, or inter-
state commerce, and whether a demonstrated injury exists, 73 courts also
began to balance foreign and United States interests.74
As explained by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America,75 an antitrust case,
the Alcoa effects analysis was incomplete because it did not consider or
balance foreign interests against the United States interest in exercising
jurisdiction and adjudicating the suit. 76 In adding a third prong, the court
acknowledged that foreign policy and international comity considera-
71. 328 U.S. 781, 811-14 (1946) (reviewing and adopting Alcoa); see Rholl, supra note
62, at 441-51 (1990) (surveying the application of the effects test to determine subject mat-
ter jurisdiction under the Sherman Act after the Alcoa decision).
Courts and federal regulatory agencies have applied the effects test to assess the extra-
territorial reach of antitrust laws on a variety of international industries. See Born, supra
note 9, at 32 (noting the broad extraterritorial application of antitrust laws under the ef-
fects doctrine). The effects doctrine was also used to determine the validity of the extrater-
ritorial application of other federal laws, including federal securities regulation, patent and
trademark laws, and various criminal laws such as the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO). See, e.g., Alfadda v. Fenn, 935 F.2d 475, 478-80 (2d Cir. 1991)
(applying the conduct test to determine if the district court had proper subject matter juris-
diction over RICO and securities fraud violations against a foreign corporation whose
predicate acts occurred within the United States but whose activities which were an actual
violation of U.S. law occurred overseas); United States v. Yousef, 927 F. Supp. 673, 678-80
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (examining the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction under the Aircraft
Sabotage Act, which does not expressly provide for such jurisdiction); Philip R. Wolf, Inter-
national Securities Fraud: Extraterritorial Subject Matter Jurisdiction, 8 N.Y. INT'L L. REV.
1, 4-14 (1995) (examining the courts' application of the effects test and the conduct test to
determine whether the extraterritorial application of U.S. securities laws is appropriate).
72. See infra notes 75-81 (discussing the addition of the third "international comity"
prong to the intentional effects and traditional conduct analyses).
73. See Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 612-13 (9th Cir. 1976)
(finding a three part analysis appropriate).
74. See Born, supra note 9, at 33-35 (noting that in response to the hostile reactions of
the international community to the application of the effects doctrine, "[liower U.S. courts
and other authorities turned, then, directly to emerging principles of public international
law and comity to define the extraterritorial reach of the antitrust laws."); see also infra
note 81 and accompanying text (discussing cases addressing the international comity
issues).
75. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
76. See id. at 613-15. In Timberlane, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants con-
spired to effect Timberlane Lumber Company's efforts to obtain lumber from Honduras.
See id. at 604. The plaintiffs alleged that this conspiracy resulted in over $5 million in
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tions7 7 must be examined when determining whether a court should as-
sert extraterritorial jurisdiction over a foreign corporation's activities. 78
Adopting a "jurisdictional rule of reason," the court stated that limiting
jurisdiction would be appropriate when United States interests fail to out-
weigh the incentive for maintaining harmonious foreign relations.7 9 In
essence, the court determined that, theoretically, United States interests
could be overridden by the disruptive effects a decision might have in the
international arena. Thus, the Timberlane court added international
comity as the third prong of its analysis.8" Other circuits, including the
Third, Fifth, and Tenth, added this third prong to the traditional effects
test.
81
damages and that such a loss had a direct and substantial effect on U.S. foreign commerce.
See id. at 605.
77. See id. at 613; see also Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895) (defining "Comity
of Nations" as "the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legisla-
tive, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international
duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are
under the protection of its laws"); In re Maxwell Communication Corp., 93 F.3d 1036,
1046-48 (2d Cir. 1996) (examining the international comity doctrine).
78. See Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 613; see also A. Paul Victor & John G. Chou, United
States Antitrust Jurisdiction Over Overseas Disputes After Title IV of the 1982 Export Trad-
ing Company Act and Timberlane, 10 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1, 6-12 (1986) (examining the
Timberlane decision and surveying various applications of the Timberlane three part
analysis).
79. See Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 614-15. The court recognized the significance of
weighing the "regard for comity and the prerogatives of other nations" in determining the
limitations upon the extraterritorial reach of U.S. antitrust laws. Id. at 612; see also
Michael G. McKinnon, Comment, Federal Judicial and Legislative Jurisdiction Over Enti-
ties Abroad: The Long-Arm of U.S. Antitrust Law and Viable Solutions Beyond The
Timberlane/Restatement Comity Approach, 21 PEPP. L. REV. 1219, 1251-96 (1994) (exam-
ining the history and development of extraterritorial analysis and discussing the application
and limitations upon comity factors in such analyses).
80. See Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 613-15.
81. See, e.g., Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 671 F.2d 876, 884-85 (5th Cir.
1982) (stating that international comity should be considered in determining whether to
apply U.S. antitrust laws extraterritorially); Montreal Trading Ltd. v. Amax Inc., 661 F.2d
864, 869-71 (10th Cir. 1981) (stating factors used in balancing U.S. and foreign interests,
and stating that "[c]omity concerns outweigh any affect on United States commerce) (em-
phasis added); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287,1297-98 (3d Cir.
1979) (adopting the Timberlane approach and sthting factors to be used for the third prong
of the analysis).
In Mannington Mills, the Third Circuit articulated several factors which should be con-
sidered when addressing international comity concerns:
(1) Degree of conflict with foreign law or policy;
(2) Nationality of the parties;
(3) Relative importance of the alleged violation of conduct [in the United States]
compared to that abroad;
(4) Availability of a remedy abroad and the pendency of litigation there;
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3. The True Conflict Test: International Comity Considerations
Narrowed
The Supreme Court recently rejected the third prong of the Timberlane
analytical framework. As a substitute for international comity considera-
tions, in determining the validity of extraterritorial subject matter juris-
diction,8" the Court created a new "true conflict" test in Hartford Fire
Insurance Co. v. California.83 In Hartford Fire, the Court held that, ab-
sent a true conflict between United States law and the law or policy of
another nation, the assertion of extraterritorial subject matter jurisdiction
by a United States court is valid.84
(5) Existence of intent to harm or affect American commerce and its
foreseeability;
(6) Possible effect upon foreign relations if the court exercises jurisdiction and
grants relief;
(7) If relief is granted, whether a party will be placed in a position of being forced
to perform an act illegal in either country or be under conflicting requirements by
both countries;
(8) Whether the court can make its order effective;
(9) Whether an order for relief would be acceptable in [the United States] if
made by the foreign national under similar circumstances; [and]
(10) Whether a treaty with the affected nations has addressed the issue.
595 F.2d at 1297-98; see also Born, supra note 9, at 37-39 (noting the Timberlane decision
formed part of the basis for the American Law Institute's Restatement (Third) Foreign Rela-
tions Law sections 402 and 403 addressing legislative jurisdiction); Victor & Chou, supra
note 78, at 6-13 (surveying various lower federal court decisions applying the Timberlane
three part analysis). But see Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731
F.2d 909, 948-49 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (rejecting the balancing of international comity analysis
in determining jurisdiction).
82. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796-97 (1993); see also John
A. Trenor, Comment, Jurisdiction and the Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust Laws
After Hartford Fire, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1583, 1589-617 (1995) (examining the change in
extraterritorial jurisdictional analysis and supporting the return to legislative jurisdiction
analysis, i.e., requiring a showing of clear congressional intent). But cf Varun Gupta,
Note, After Hartford Fire: Antitrust and Comity, 84 GEO. L.J. 2287, 2315-18 (1996) (de-
fending the Hartford decision and advocating the complete abandonment of international
comity considerations in extraterritorial antitrust enforcement).
83. 509 U.S. 764 (1993). In Hartford Fire, 19 states and various private parties brought
antitrust suits against domestic insurers, domestic and foreign reinsurers, and insurance
brokers, alleging that London reinsurers were engaged in a conspiracy to affect the U.S.
insurance market and that their conduct produced a substantial effect in the United States.
See id. at 770-71, 794-95. The London reinsurers argued that the exercise of jurisdiction by
a U.S. court was improper under the principle of international comity. See id. at 798-99.
The District Court found that international comity considerations were an important factor
which led to its determination that the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction over British
defendants would be inappropriate. See id. at 778. The Ninth Circuit reversed on the
extraterritorial jurisdiction issue and remanded on other grounds. See id. at 778-79.
84. See id. at 798-99; see also Robert C. Reuland, Hartford Fire Insurance Co., Comity,
and the Extraterritorial Reach of United States Antitrust Laws, 29 TEX. INT'L L.J. 159, 172-
73 (1994) (explaining the Hartford Fire holding); Gupta, supra note 82, at 2299-305 (exam-
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Revisiting the standard two-prong Alcoa effects test, the Court rea-
soned that the extraterritorial application of United States law is appro-
priate if such conduct has a demonstrated effect within the United States
and the foreign entity intended to affect United States commerce, im-
ports, or exports through its conduct.85 The Court stated that the juris-
dictional nexus is the effect of the intentional foreign conduct upon the
United States.86 Therefore, after Hartford Fire, international comity is
no longer a consideration in determining the validity of exercising extra-
territorial subject matter jurisdiction; Justice Souter, however, writing for
the majority, hinted that international comity considerations may still be
addressed within a court's personal jurisdiction analysis.87
By removing international comity from the threshold extraterritorial
subject matter jurisdiction analysis, the Court narrowed the definition of
a true conflict between United States and foreign law.88 The Court did
not elaborate or provide additional guidelines for its true conflict stan-
dard for determining when such a conflict exists.89 As a result, the true
conflict standard may be open to two interpretations. Under the first, a
true conflict may exist only if the foreign sovereign mandates a particular
activity. 90 Under the second interpretation, a true conflict may exist
ining the "true conflict" standard and both the majority and minority opinions' use of the
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States)).
85. Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 779. See generally Dam, supra note I (examining the
Hartford decision in the context of an international policy decision and how domestic eco-
nomic polices are increasingly conflicting with international relations due to the acceler-
ated integration of the global economy).
86. Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 796.
87. See id. at 795-99; id. at 797 n.24 (noting that after the determination of valid sub-
ject matter jurisdiction, international comity considerations may still be addressed within a
court's personal jurisdiction analysis.
88. See id. at 797-99; see also Dam, supra note 1, at 302; Mary Catherine Pelini, Case
Comment, The Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Analysis in Light of Hartford Fire Insurance
Co. v. California: How Peripheral Has the International Comity Notion Become?, 55 OHIo
ST. L.J. 477, 478, 481-89 (1994) (explaining the differences between the majority and dis-
senting opinions' treatment of the true conflict standard and the utilization of international
comity considerations within extraterritorial jurisdictional analysis).
Dissenting in Hartford Fire, Justice Scalia stated that it is a firmly established principle in
U.S. jurisprudence that U.S. courts use international legal principles to limit the extraterri-
torial reach of U.S. statutes. Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 813-22 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Jus-
tice Scalia expressed concern that the majority opinion would create unnecessary conflicts
with other countries, "particularly our closest trading partners." Id. at 820.
89. See Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 798-99; see also In re Maxwell Communication
Corp., 93 F.3d 1036, 1047-49 (2d Cir. 1996) (explaining two possible applications of interna-
tional comity in light of Hartford Fire); Metro Indus., Inc. v. Sammi Corp., 82 F.3d 839, 846
n.5 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 181 (1996) (discussing the direct conflict standard and
the use of comity factors in an extraterritorial jurisdiction analysis).
90. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Editorial Comment, Conflict, Balancing of Interests,
and the Exercise of Jurisdiction to Prescribe: Reflections on the Insurance Antitrust Case, 89
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when a foreign defendant cannot simultaneously comply with the laws of
his own country and those of the United States.9 While confusion re-
mains concerning the exact interpretation of a true conflict, 92 the major-
ity opinion in Hartford Fire implied that true conflicts would have
potentially serious repercussions upon international relations and United
States foreign policy. 93
4. Foreign Blocking Statutes: Foreign Governments' Response to
United States Assertions of Extraterritorial Subject Matter
Jurisdiction
In response to United States extraterritorial legislation, many countries
have enacted blocking statutes intended to bar the extraterritorial reach
of United States law upon their governments, citizens, and corpora-
tions.94 Blocking statutes protect the enacting country's commercial in-
terests by preventing the recognition or enforcement of United States
judgments, orders, and legislation.95 Blocking statutes prohibit the enact-
AM. J. INT'L L. 42, 48, 50 (1995) (explaining the foreign sovereign compulsion defense and
providing an example based on the facts of Hartford Fire). For example, within the context
of Helms-Burton, suppose that France passes a law that mandates certain French compa-
nies engage in trade and commercial activities with Cuba that would be considered traffick-
ing violations of Helms-Burton. This scenario, while unlikely, would constitute a "true"
conflict because France is requiring certain French corporations to engage in a particular
activity that directly conflicts with Helms-Burton.
91. See Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 799; see also Metro Indus., 82 F.3d at 847 (examining
the application of the direct conflict test). For example, assume that a French company
voluntarily engages in commercial activities in Cuba that violate Helms-Burton and the
company is sued by the former American owner of the property. France then enacts vari-
ous blocking statutes to bar the recognition of extraterritorial assertion of jurisdiction by
courts of the United States. The French company, therefore, would be unable to simulta-
neously comply with both the French blocking statute and U.S. law and, therefore, would
be in a true conflict. See Fairley, supra note 20, at 31-32 (analyzing Canadian blocking
legislation enacted to counter Helms-Burton under this interpretation).
92- See Lowenfeld, supra note 90, at 45-47 (examining the views of the Supreme Court
regarding the true conflict standard). American plaintiffs under Helms-Burton would favor
the first interpretation, while foreign defendants would favor the second.
93. Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 798-99 (determining that a foreign defendant's compli-
ance with a U.S. District Court order did not create a direct conflict with the foreign block-
ing statutes and policies of the defendant's country).
94. See A.V. Lowe, Blocking Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: The British Protection of
Trading Interests Act, 1980, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 257, 258-62, 267-80 (1981) (discussing the
historical evolution of British blocking legislation and the conflicts between the United
States and United Kingdom over the assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction); R. Edward
Price, Foreign Blocking Statutes and the GATT: State Sovereignty and the Enforcement of
U.S. Economic Laws Abroad, 28 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 315, 322-26 (1995)
(providing a history of foreign blocking statutes and explaining the different types).
95. See Price, supra note 94, at 325-26 (describing the different types of blocking stat-
utes). Britain, Australia, South Africa, and New Zealand all have blocking statutes
designed to prohibit compliance with foreign (United States) measures that attempt to
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ing country's citizens and corporations from complying with United
States court discovery orders and enforcement mechanisms to obtain
judgments.96 To enforce such prohibitions, blocking statutes typically
subject citizens attempting to comply with United States court orders to
civil penalties or monetary sanctions.97
In Socitj Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States District
Court for the Southern District of Iowa,98 the Supreme Court examined a
French blocking statute that precluded French citizens from disclosing ev-
idence to United States courts.99 The Court held that the French block-
ing statute did not preclude a United States court from ordering a foreign
party subject to the court's jurisdiction to produce evidence, even if pro-
ducing the evidence violated the blocking statute.100 The Court stated
that international comity should be used only to determine the extraterri-
regulate or control international trade. The primary method to frustrate the exercise of
jurisdiction is the prohibition of providing documents or information in response to discov-
ery requests from foreign (United States) courts. See P.M. Roth, Reasonable Extraterrito-
riality: Correcting the "Balance of Interests," 41 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 245, 253 (1992)
(examining the international version of the effects doctrine and suggesting moderation in
the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction).
An example of such a blocking statute is Canada's Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act
(FEMA). R.S.C., ch. F-29, §§ 1-11 (1984)(Can.). FEMA was initially promulgated after
the Alcoa decision to block the extraterritorial extension of U.S. antitrust laws to Canadian
businesses; however, it has been used solely to counter the U.S. embargo on Cuba and its
anti-Cuban trade measures. See Tim Kennish & Elizabeth Shriver, Foreign Blocking Leg-
islation-Canada, Remarks at the American Conference Institute Program "Beyond Cuba;
United States International Business Restrictions: Compliance with Libertad and Other
Controls" (June 24, 1996). In response to Helms-Burton, Canada amended FEMA with
the Foreign Extraterritorial Measures (United States) Order (FEMO). R.S.C., ch. F-29
(1984), amended by 1996 S.C. 611 (Can.). FEMO directs Canadian businesses and their
officers not to comply with an extraterritorial measure of the United States that affects
trade or commerce between Canada and Cuba. See id. at 612-13. Mexico has enacted
similar legislation to block the application of Helms-Burton. See Mexican Senate Approves
Law Countering Helms-Burton Measure, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 38, at 1496-97
(Sept. 25, 1996) (reporting the passage of Mexican blocking legislation enacted specifically
to counter Helms-Burton).
96. See GARY B. BORN & DAVID WESTIN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN
UNITED STATES COURTS 367-73 (2d ed. 1992) (examining foreign blocking legislation en-
acted specifically in response to U.S. court discovery orders); Najeeb Samie, Extraterrito-
rial Enforcement of United States Antitrust Laws: The British Reaction, 16 INT'L LAW. 313,
314 (1982) (noting that U.S. courts assert jurisdiction over foreign parties regardless of the
existence of foreign blocking statutes); Mark Brodeur, Note, Court Ordered Violations of
Foreign Bank Secrecy and Blocking Laws: Solving the Extraterritorial Dilemma, 1988 U.
ILL. L. REV. 563, 569 (describing the two types of blocking statutes and explaining the
government's oversight role in their enforcement).
97. See Price, supra note 94 at 325-26 (explaining the purpose and different types of
foreign blocking statutes).
98. 482 U.S. 522 (1987).
99. See id. at 543-47 & n.29.
100. See id. at 543-46 & n.29.
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torial reach of United States discovery orders in cases where interna-
tional legal conventions of evidence apply. 10 1
The Court's interpretation and handling of foreign blocking statutes in
Aerospatiale, coupled with the Court's analysis in Hartford Fire, implies
that true conflicts must entail either dire repercussions for the foreign
defendant or serious ramifications for United States foreign relations."0 2
Under this interpretation, a foreign party's mere inconvenience of having
to choose between sanctions for violating a foreign blocking statute, or
sanctions for not complying with a United States court order, will not
ordinarily be considered a true conflict.
10 3
B. Extraterritorial Assertion of Personal Jurisdiction: Due Process
Protection Does Not Disappear
Although a clear showing of congressional intent to apply United
States laws extraterritorially will defeat international law arguments ad-
vanced in United States courts,0 4 Congress and the courts may not dis-
regard constitutional due process protections afforded foreign defendants
haled into United States courts. 105 The Due Process Clause protects de-
101. See id. at 543-44; see also Born, supra note 9, at 49 (explaining the application of
discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in regard to the Aerospatiale
decision within an international context).
102. See Dam, supra note 1, at 311 (examining Aerospatiale and the Court's interpreta-
tion of true conflicts and international comity analysis).
103. See Lowenfeld, supra note 90, at 46-47 (explaining the Hartford Fire majority's
interpretation of the true conflict test).
104. See, e.g., EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 224, 248 (1991) ("[L]egislation
of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States.") (emphasis added); Commodities Futures Trading
Comm'n v. Nahas, 738 F.2d 487, 495 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("Federal courts must give effect to a
valid, unambiguous congressional mandate, even if such effect would conflict with another
nation's laws or violate international law."); United States v. Pinto-Mejia, 720 F.2d 248, 259
(2d Cir. 1983) ("As long as Congress has expressly indicated its intent to reach conduct
[occurring outside the United States], 'a United States court would be bound to follow the
Congressional direction unless this would violate the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment."' (quoting Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326,
1334 (2d Cir. 1972)); Pacific Seafarers, Inc. v. Pacific Far E. Line, Inc., 404 F.2d 804, 812
n.20 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (finding that the courts' obligation to follow congressional intent is
greater than its obligation to follow principles of international law to promote harmony,
except when Congressional intent runs contrary to constitutional mandates).
105. See United States v. Thomas, 893 F.2d 1066, 1068 (9th Cir. 1990) (observing that
the application of a congressional statute cannot violate the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment); Walpex Trading Co. v. Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales Bolivianos,
712 F. Supp. 383, 390 (1989) (stating that Congress cannot "override the constitutional due
process constraints underlying personal jurisdiction"); cf Restatement (Third) Foreign Re-
lations Law § 403(2), at 244-45 (1987) (stating when the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion would be unreasonable); see also infra notes 110-30 and accompanying text (discussing
the due process protections afforded foreign defendants haled into U.S. courts).
Extraterritoriality Concerns Re Helms-Burton
fendants from unfair and unreasonable jurisdictional assertions. 10 6 A for-
eign defendant haled into the United States court system is entitled to the
same due process protections afforded United States citizens.' 0 7 Thus,
The foundation for the exercise of personal jurisdiction was established by the Supreme
Court in Pennoyer v. Neff. 95 U.S. (5 Otto) 714 (1878). In Pennoyer, the Court used princi-
ples of international law in finding that "every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and
sovereignty over persons and property within its territory.. . . [And] no State can exercise
direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or property without its territory." Id. at 722;
see also Patrick J. Borchers, The Death of the Constitutional Law of Personal Jurisdiction:
From Pennoyer to Burnham and Back Again, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 19, 32-39 (1990)
(examining the Pennoyer case, the "territorial principle," and the historical evolution of
the constitutional legal principles governing personal jurisdiction); Wendy Collins Perdue,
Sin, Scandal, and Substantive Due Process: Personal Jurisdiction and Pennoyer Reconsid-
ered, 62 WASH. L. REV. 479,480-90 (1987) (examining the history of the Pennoyer case and
then tracing the development of modern jurisdiction jurisprudence).
106. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. ("No person shall be... deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law ...."); see also Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v.
Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 701-03 (1982) ("The validity of an order
of a federal court depends upon that court's having jurisdiction over both the subject mat-
ter and the parties." (citing Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 171-72 (1938) and Thompson v.
Whitman, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 457, 465 (1874))); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310, 320 (1945) (holding that a defendant must have sufficient contacts with the forum
before a forum court can exercise personal jurisdiction); Brilmayer & Norchi, supra note 8,
at 1224-39 (examining the evolution of state and federal extraterritoriality and concluding
that the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause limits federal acts, just as the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause limits state action); Peter A. Diana & J. Michael Regis-
ter, Recent Development, Personal Jurisdiction In Flux: Insurance Corp. of Ireland v.
Compagnie Des Bauxites De Guinee, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 136, 137-43 (1983) (discussing
the due process limitations, originating from both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,
upon the exercise of personal jurisdiction).
107. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 268-69 (1990) (stating that
the word "person" in the Fifth Amendment should be defined as a relatively universal
term). The Supreme Court recognized the importance of extending jurisdiction to nonresi-
dent defendants in Hanson v. Denckla. 357 U.S. 235 (1958). The Court stated, "As techno-
logical progress has increased the flow of commerce between States, the need for
jurisdiction over nonresidents has undergone a similar increase. . . . But it is a mistake to
assume that this trend heralds the eventual demise of all restrictions on the personal juris-
diction of state courts." Id. at 250-51; see also, Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A.
v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 413-14 (1984) ("The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment operates to limit the power of a State to assert in personam jurisdiction over a non-
resident defendant."); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530 (1954) (holding that foreign
defendants are entitled to due process protection); Afram Export Corp. v. Metallurgiki
Halyps, S.A., 772 F.2d 1358, 1362 (7th Cir. 1985) ("Countless cases assume that foreign
companies have all the rights of U.S. citizens to object to extraterritorial assertions of per-
sonal jurisdiction."); Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Vigman, 764 F.2d 1309, 1315
(9th Cir. 1985) ("When a federal district court is sitting in diversity ... due process re-
quires that the defendant have some 'contacts, ties or relations' with the forum state ....
Where a federal statute . . . confers nationwide service of process, 'the question becomes
whether the party has sufficient contacts with the United States ... ').
Even though federal courts have rarely addressed this issue, it does not mean that due
process limitations on the extraterritorial application of U.S. law do not exist. See United
States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1990) ("In order to apply extraterritorially a
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when examining legislation clearly intended to have an extraterritorial
effect, the requirements of subject matter jurisdiction and personal juris-
diction must be distinguished.1"8 Congress's power to link personal juris-
diction to subject matter jurisdiction is constrained by the Due Process
Clause in order to protect foreign defendants from arbitrary and unfair
litigation. 1° 9
1. Minimum Contacts Requirements
The cornerstone of jurisdictional due process is that a nondomicilliary
party who is not served with legal process within the borders of the forum
state must have minimum contacts with the forum attempting to exercise
personal jurisdiction, so that maintaining the action "does not offend
'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."'1" 0 The Due Pro-
cess Clause does not allow a United States court to exercise personal ju-
federal criminal statute to a defendant consistently with due process, there must be a suffi-
cient nexus between the defendant and the United States so that such application would
not be arbitrary or fundamentally unfair.") (citation omitted); see also Ellencrig, supra
note 51, at 370 (examining Rule 4(k) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows
for the extraterritorial jurisdiction of U.S. courts over foreign defendants when an action is
brought under federal law).
108. See Seetransport Wiking Trader Schiffarhtsgesellschaft MBH & Co., Kommand-
itgesellschaft v. Navimpex Centrala Navala, 989 F.2d 572, 580-81 (2d Cir. 1993) ("[Legisla-
tion] cannot create personal jurisdiction where the Constitution forbids it."); Drexel
Burnham Lambert Group, Inc. v. Committee of Receivers for A.W. Galadari, 810 F. Supp.
1375, 1388-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (subject matter jurisdiction analysis and constitutional due
process analysis should be conducted separately); Walpex Trading, 712 F. Supp. at 390
("Congress did not have the authority to override the constitutional due process con-
straints underlying personal jurisdiction when it drafted the FSIA.").
109. See Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300,
307 (2d Cir. 1981) (stating that a federal statute attempting to merge personal jurisdiction
into subject matter jurisdiction is prohibited by the Due Process Clause); Haugen, supra
note 54, at 111-14 (examining the Supreme Court's position that the Due Process Clauses
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments protect foreign defendants from unreasonable
assertions of jurisdiction by U.S. courts).
110. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316; see also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471
U.S. 462, 474 (1985) ("[Tjhe constitutional touchstone [of the determination of whether
the exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with due process] remains whether the de-
fendant purposefully established 'minimum contacts' in the forum State."). While the
Court in International Shoe addressed due process limitations within the context of the
Fourteenth Amendment, as opposed to the Fifth Amendment, the legal analysis remains
the same under either of the due process clauses. See Murray S. Levin, Judicial Jurisdiction
in International Civil Litigation, 6 INT'L Q. 66, 76 (1994) ("United States courts have gener-
ally applied the same, basic due process standards developed in domestic cases . . . to
international cases."). See generally Friedrich K. Juenger, A Shoe Unfit for Globetrotting,
28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1027, 1034-37 (1995) (criticizing International Shoe and its applica-
tion); Silberman, supra note 56, at 756-57 (explaining the constitutional analytic framework
in International Shoe).
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risdiction over a person or corporate entity that does not have "contacts,
ties, or relations" to that forum.'11
The Supreme Court developed a two-pronged test to determine the
validity of exercising personal jurisdiction in International Shoe v. Wash-
ington.' 12 The first prong requires courts to examine the nature and qual-
ity of the defendant's contacts with the forum under a reasonableness
test. 1 3 The second prong tests the sufficiency of contacts of the connec-
111. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319. Several courts have created a minimum con-
tacts test specifically to determine if activities of a foreign corporation related to the
United States satisfy the due process standard. The Second Circuit articulated the follow-
ing factors: (1) transacting business in the United States, (2) doing an act in the United
States, or (3) having an effect in the United States by an act done elsewhere. See Leasco
Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1340 (2d Cir. 1972) (explaining
the Second Circuit's minimum contacts test for foreign corporations); see also Eskofot v.
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 872 F. Supp. 81, 87-88 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (explaining and
applying the Second Circuit's minimum contacts test for foreign corporations).
112. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). In International Shoe, a Delaware corporation, with its princi-
pal place of business in St. Louis, Missouri, manufactured and sold shoes in a variety of
states. See id. at 313. It did not maintain an office or store merchandise in the state of
Washington, but did employ thirteen salesmen to promote and sell its goods. See id. The
state of Washington brought an action against International Shoe Co. to recover unpaid
unemployment contributions required by state statute. See id. at 311. International Shoe
Co. objected to the assertion of jurisdiction by the Washington court, contending that it did
not have "presence" within the state and therefore was protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from unreasonable assertions of jurisdiction. See id.
at 315. The Supreme Court held that International Shoe Co. had "rendered itself amena-
ble to suit upon obligations arising out of its activities of the salesmen in Washington ....
The state thus has constitutional power to. . .subject [the company] to a suit ..... Id. at
322; see Christopher D. Cameron & Kevin R. Johnson, Death of a Salesman? Forum Shop-
ping and Outcome Determination Under International Shoe, 28 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 769,
786-96, 805-17 (1995) (providing a detailed summary of the facts of International Shoe and
the Supreme Court's opinion).
113. See International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316-19; see also infra notes 135-38. The factors
used under the first prong to determine the reasonableness of exercise of jurisdiction were
expanded upon in succeeding cases. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444
U.S. 286, 297 (1980) (establishing the "reasonably foreseeable requirement" in which it
must be reasonably foreseeable that the defendant may be haled into the forum's court);
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (establishing the "purposeful availment" re-
quirement in which a defendant's actions afford it the "benefits and protection" of the
forum state's laws); McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957) (holding that
jurisdiction is valid when a defendant's actions create a "substantial connection" with the
forum state).
Today, there are numerous factors used by courts in determining whether the assertion
of jurisdiction over a foreign defendant would offend "traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice," including: (1) the benefits and protections of the forum state's laws; (2)
the regularity and continuous systematic dealings in the forum state; (3) if the activities
arose out of contacts in the forum state; (4) if the activities were substantial; (5) the de-
fendant's convenience in litigating in the forum state; (6) the existence of an appropriate
long-arm statute; (7) the economic benefit derived from adjudicating the suit; and (8) the
quality and nature of the defendant's activities in the forum state. See Asahi Metal Indus.
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tion between the cause of action and the contacts with the forum.1 14 In
subsequent cases, the Supreme Court has emphasized that involuntary
contacts with a United States forum do not satisfy the minimum contacts
test.' 1
5
The Supreme Court created two factors to aid its analysis under the
second prong of the minimum contacts test in World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson." 6 First, the defendant must have "purposefully
avail[ed]" himself of the protections and benefits of the forum state's
law." 7 Second, it must be deemed reasonably foreseeable that the de-
fendant would be haled into a court of the forum state.11 In World-Wide
Volkswagen, the Court stated that these two factors may be satisfied if the
claims are "related to" or "arise from" a nonresident defendant's contacts
with the forum state.'1 9 This language was the precursor to the develop-
ment of "specific [personal] jurisdiction" later defined by the Court."' 0
Co. v. Superior Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987) (stating the factors used by the Court under
the reasonableness prong of its minimum contacts analysis).
114. See International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316-19; see also infra notes 116-20 and accom-
panying text (explaining the factors used in the second prong of the minimum contacts
analysis).
115. See Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253 (stating that the defendant must have purposefully
availed himself of the privilege of acting in the forum state so as to invoke the benefits and
protections of the forum's laws).
116. 444 U.S. 286 (1980). In World-Wide Volkswagen, plaintiffs traveling from New
York were injured in a car accident in Oklahoma. See id. at 288. Plaintiffs brought a
products liability suit in Oklahoma against the defendants, a retail car dealer and a re-
gional distributor, located in New York and New Jersey, respectively. See id. at 289. The
Court conducted a two pronged minimum contacts analysis. See id. at 292-94. See gener-
ally Charles W. Adams, World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson-The Rest of the Story, 72
NEB. L. REV. 1122, 1152-55 (1993) (examining the significance of the case today in the
context of personal jurisdiction analysis).
117. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297 (repeating the purposeful availment re-
quirement (citing Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253)). See generally Winton D. Woods, Carnival
Cruise Lines v. Shute: An Amicus Inquiry Into The Future of "Purposeful Availment," 36
WAYNE L. REV. 1393, 1407-12 (1990) (surveying the court's application of the purposeful
availment requirement).
118. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297. The only relevant foreseeability is
whether the defendant could foresee litigation based on his conduct and connection with
the forum. See id. This concept is also described as "litigative foreseeability." See Adams,
supra note 116, at 1154 (explaining that the standard of reasonable foreseeability was cre-
ated to determine whether the minimum contacts requirement was satisfied for a nonresi-
dent defendant and remains the "governing standard for minimum contacts in personal
jurisdiction cases.").
119. World-wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292.
120. See id. The rationale for this rule is that modern means of transportation, commu-
nication, and conducting business has reduced earlier obstacles to defending suits brought
in other states. See id. at 295 (citing commentary in Hanson v. Denckla); see also Mark M.
Maloney, Note, Specific Personal Jurisdiction and the 'Arise from or Relate to' Requirement
... What Does It Mean?, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1265, 1272-75 (1993) (explaining the
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2. Two Types of Personal Jurisdiction: General and Specific
After World-Wide Volkswagen, the Supreme Court recognized and dis-
tinguished two types of personal jurisdiction: "general jurisdiction" and
"specific jurisdiction." In Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v.
Hall, 2 ' the Court explained that general jurisdiction is based upon the
defendant's contacts with the forum as a whole.122 Under general juris-
diction, a United States court may hear a claim against a defendant re-
gardless of the claim's relation to the contacts with the forum.123 The
jurisdictional nexus in federal question cases is the foreign defendant's
"continuous and systematic" contacts with the United States as a whole,
and not its specific contacts within the territorial boundaries of the forum
court. 124 Echoing World-Wide Volkswagen, the Court defined specific ju-
risdiction as "jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit arising out of or re-
lated to the defendant's contacts with the forum.' '125.
The exercise of general jurisdiction requires a higher minimum contacts
threshold than specific jurisdiction.126 To assert general jurisdiction in
Court's jurisdictional analysis in Helicopteros which led to the creation of general and spe-
cific jurisdictions).
121. 466 U.S. 408 (1984); see id. at 414 n.9 (defining "general jurisdiction" and "specific
jurisdiction"). In International Shoe, the Court first implicitly acknowledged the existence
of general and specific jurisdiction, but failed to provide further guidance on the differ-
ences and legal standards between them. 326 U.S. at 317 ("defendant's 'continuous and
systematic' activities confer jurisdiction to adjudicate causes of action unrelated to forum
activities, whereas 'single or isolated' acts at best permit the exercise of jurisdiction to
adjudicate consequences of these very acts.").
122. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414 n.9; see also Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co.,
342 U.S. 437 (1952) (establishing the "continuous and systematic" contacts requirement for
the exercise of general jurisdiction); Weintraub, supra note 53, at 537-39 (examining the
requirements for "continuous and systematic contacts").
123. See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414-15.
124. See id. (clarifying the number of contacts necessary to establish general jurisdic-
tion). The "continuous and systematic" contacts language was first used by the Supreme
Court in an earlier case, Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952),
where the Supreme Court upheld the exercise of jurisdiction over a foreign corporation,
even though the cause of action did not arise out of the foreign defendant's activities
within the forum state. See id. at 438, 445. In Perkins, a Philippine corporation conducted
administrative activities in Ohio due to the Japanese occupation of the Philippines during
World War II. See id. at 447-48. Even though the cause of action did not arise out of its
activities in Ohio, the Supreme Court held that the foreign defendant was "carrying on...
a continuous and systematic ... part of its general business" within the state, and therefore
it was reasonable and just for the forum court to exercise personal jurisdiction. See id. at
438.
125. See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414 n.9.
126. See Perkins, 342 U.S. at 445-48; see also Lea Brilmayer et al., A General Look at
General Jurisdiction, 66 TEX. L. REV. 721, 727-28 (1988); Mary Twitchell, The Myth of
General Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REV. 610, 631, 633-34 (1988) (concluding most courts
require more substantial contacts to exercise general jurisdiction); Pierre Riou, Note, Gen-
eral Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations: All That Glitters is not Gold Issue Mining, 14
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federal question cases, the party being subjected to the court's authority
must have continuous and systematic contacts with the United States,
thereby deriving the benefits and protections of United States law.1 17
The party does not need to have contact with the specific forum of the
court exercising jurisdiction.'28
In determining whether continuous and systematic contacts exist,
courts examine whether the nonresident or foreign defendant has a regu-
lar place of business in the United States, is licensed to do business in the
United States, or has other substantial, continuous, and systematic con-
tacts within the United States.'29 These inquiries have been criticized for
being both too broad and too narrow, because most United States courts
have difficulty articulating and applying the factors within the Interna-
tional Shoe framework. 130
REV. LITIG. 741, 769-75 (1995) (examining the "continuous and systematic contacts" re-
quirement of general jurisdiction).
127. See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414-16 (analyzing the contacts necessary to satisfy
due process requirements); see also Thos. P. Gonzalez Corp. v. Consejo Nacional de
Produccion de Costa Rica, 614 F.2d 1247, 1252 (9th Cir. 1980) ("[I]t is not the quantity, but
rather the 'nature and quality' of the defendant's activities which determine whether exten-
sion of jurisdiction offends due process.").
128. See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414-15; see also Kern v. Jeppesen Sanderson, Inc., 867
F. Supp. 525, 534 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (explaining that contacts with the forum as a whole must
be substantial as well as continuous and systematic); Gates Learjet Corp. v. Jensen, 743
F.2d 1325, 1330-31 (9th Cir. 1984) (analyzing defendant's contacts with a forum state to
determine whether they were sufficient to establish general jurisdiction).
In assessing the sufficiency of the contacts to determine if these contacts are "continuous
and systematic," federal courts most often rely on the following factors:
[T]he extent to which defendants availed themselves of the privileges of Ameri-
can law, the extent to which litigation in the United States would be foreseeable
to them, the inconvenience to defendants of litigating in the United States, and
the countervailing interest of the United States in hearing the suit.
Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 314 (2d Cir.
1987); see also Debra Windsor, Comment, How Specific Can We Make General Jurisdic-
tion: The Search For A Refined Set Of Standards, 44 BAYLOR L. REV. 593, 606-13 (1992)
(examining other federal circuits' tests for general jurisdiction).
129. See Obenchain Corp. v. Corporation Nacionale de Inversiones, 656 F. Supp. 435,
440-41 (W.D. Penn. 1987) (applying the Texas Trading factors to general jurisdiction analy-
sis); Meadows v. Dominican Republic, 628 F. Supp. 599, 606-07 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (same);
Schmidt v. Polish People's Republic, 579 F. Supp. 23, 28 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (same).
130. See Juenger, supra note 53, at 4, 7 (describing the quagmire of lower court deci-
sions addressing jurisdictional principles); Silberman, supra note 56, at 764-66 (explaining
that there has been little legislative or judicial guidance in formulating criteria for general
jurisdiction analysis).
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3. The Supreme Court Obscures Jurisdictional Analysis
In Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court,131 the Supreme Court
held that the assertion of specific personal jurisdiction was unreasonable
despite a foreign defendant's minimum contacts with California. t32 The
Supreme Court in Asahi attempted to clarify proper assertion of personal
jurisdiction over foreign defendants, 133 but the Court only succeeded in
confusing jurisdictional analysis by failing to establish a clear and coher-
ent analytic framework.1
34
Eight justices agreed that the first prong of the jurisdictional analysis is
the "reasonableness" of asserting jurisdiction, and that this prong is ana-
lyzed based on the traditional factors established in International Shoe.135
In his concurrence, Justice Brennan articulated five factors that should be
used in determining whether the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable and
fair:1 36 (1) the burden placed on the defendant; (2) the United States
forum's interests; (3) the plaintiff's interest in obtaining a remedy; (4) the
United States judicial system's interest in promoting judicial economy;
and (5) the common interest of the states in furthering fundamental social
policies.1 37
The Court, however, split four to four on the appropriate standard for
the second prong of minimum contacts analysis . 38 Emphasizing different
factors from World-Wide Volkswagen, the two pluralities suggested differ-
ent rationales for reaching the Court's judgment. 39 One opinion, written
131. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
132. See id. at 113-16.
133. See id. at 105. In Asahi, plaintiffs who were injured in a motorcycle accident due
to allegedly defective parts in a tire, brought suit in a California court against the
Taiwanese tire tube manufacturer and Asahi, a Japanese valve assembly manufacture. See
id. at 105-06. The plaintiffs settled out of court but the Taiwanese defendant maintained its
cross-claim against Asahi. See id. at 106. The California court held that jurisdiction was
valid upon Asahi because, even though it did not directly or purposefully import its prod-
ucts into the United States, it was foreseeable that its products might end up in the United
States. See id. at 107. The Court of Appeals of California reversed but the California
Supreme Court held that the exercise of jurisdiction was reasonable. See id.
134. See infra notes 142-47 and accompanying text (discussing the confusion existing in
the lower courts' jurisdictional analyses after Asahi).
135. See Ashai, 480 U.S. at 113. Reasonableness is determined through a balance of
interests test that analyzes five factors. See id. (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodsen, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980)).
136. See id. at 116-17; see also Weintraub, supra note 53, at 539-40 (explaining the com-
plexities of personal jurisdiction analysis and suggesting more efficient methods to analyze
jurisdiction in an effort to reduce confusion and aid judicial economy).
137. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113.
138. See id. at 108-16 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion), 116-20 (Brennan, J., concurring
in part).
139. See id. at 116 (Brennan, J., concurring in part).
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by Justice O'Connor, focused on the purposeful availment require-
ment. 141 The other opinion, written by Justice Brennan, focused on the
litigative foreseeability requirement. 14 1
This lack of a consensus has further confused what analysis United
States courts should use in determining the validity of exercising personal
jurisdiction over foreign or nonresident defendants. 142 Due to the ab-
sence of a clear jurisdictional analytical framework, federal courts con-
tinue to intertwine the factors used in both general and specific personal
jurisdictional analyses. 143 This confusion has led the lower federal and
state courts to develop of a wide variety of analytical frameworks. 144
Lower courts have remained consistent in applying the factors em-
ployed under the first prong of the analysis to evaluate the reasonable-
ness of asserting jurisdiction. 45 After Asahi, however, courts have had
difficulty in evaluating the sufficiency of the defendant's contacts with the
forum under the second prong.146 Unfortunately, the courts have devel-
oped a sufficiency of contacts test that borrows requirements and factors
140. See id. at 108-13 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).
141. See id. at 116-20 (Brennan, J., concurring in part).
142. See Juenger, supra note 53, at 2-4 (examining the current chaos that reigns in the
U.S. law of jurisdiction and the effects upon the international community of America's
"unenlightened parochialism" for disregarding international models for determining the
exercise of jurisdiction).
143. See Payne v. Motorists' Mut. Ins. Cos., 4 F.3d 452, 455 (6th Cir. 1993) (creating a
three part test for personal jurisdiction in the absence of continuous contacts between the
defendant and the forum); Madara v. Hall, 916 F.2d 1510, 1515 (1lth Cir. 1990) (noting
that jurisdiction should be determined based on the facts of each case, not through a juris-
dictional analysis); see also Maloney, supra note 120, at 1276-86 (explaining the two pri-
mary tests used by courts to analyze the "arise from or relate to" requirement).
144. See Barone v. Rich Bros. Interstate Display Fireworks Co., 25 F.3d 610, 614 (8th
Cir. 1994) (rejecting Justice O'Connor's Asahi opinion); Ham v. La Cienega Music Co., 4
F.3d 413,415 (5th Cir. 1993) (stating that the Fifth Circuit will continue to follow pre-Asahi
precedent absent a clear Supreme Court majority).
145. See Levin, supra note 110, at 77-78 (examining the lower courts' application of the
reasonableness prong of the minimum contacts analysis); see also supra note 113 (examin-
ing the factors courts use for their analysis under the reasonableness inquiry of the mini-
mum contacts test).
146. Compare Falkirk Mining Co. v. Japan Steel Works, Ltd., 906 F.2d 369, 374-75 (8th
Cir. 1990) (applying Justice O'Connor's approach to the second prong of the minimum
contacts analysis), with Irving v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 864 F.2d 383, 385-86 (5th
Cir. 1989) (applying Justice Brennan's approach to the second prong of the minimum con-
tacts analysis); see also Levin, supra note 110, at 78-79 (examining the lower courts division
regarding the application of the "purposeful availment" test); Bruce Posnak, The Court
Doesn't Know Its Asahi from Its Wortman: A Critical View of the Constitutional Con-
straints on Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 41 SYRACUSE L. REV. 875, 885-86, 901-02 (1990)
(criticizing the courts' sufficiency of contacts tests for having "too many complicated and
uncertain variables").
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developed to address either general or specific jurisdiction, as well as the
factors used to determine reasonableness. 47
4. Articulating a Coherent Analytical Framework for the Second
Prong of the Minimum Contacts Analysis
Although the lower courts have been unable to agree on an appropri-
ate analytical framework for the second prong of the minimum contacts
analysis, the Second Circuit articulated a coherent approach in Texas
Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria. 48 The Second
Circuit explained that in determining whether a foreign defendant's con-
tacts with the forum are sufficient to exercise valid personal jurisdiction, a
court must evaluate four factors: (1) the degree to which the defendants
availed themselves of the benefits of United States law; (2) the foresee-
ability of litigating in the United States; (3) the defendants' inconven-
ience in litigating in the United States; and, (4) the interests of the United
States in adjudicating the suit.' 49
In the absence of a more coherent analytical framework for determin-
ing the validity of the exercise of personal jurisdiction, this Comment will
apply these four factors for analysis under the sufficiency of contacts sec-
ond prong of the traditional two-step analysis in evaluating jurisdictional
issues raised by the extraterritorial application of Helms-Burton."' °
III. DUE PROCESS AND DIRECT CONFLICTS: SEARCHING FOR
REASONABLE LIMITATIONS ON EXTRATERRITORIAL
LEGISLATION UNDER CURRENT LEGAL
STANDARDS
Given the lack of guidance and coherence provided by the Supreme
Court regarding due process and extraterritorial jurisdiction analysis, it is
difficult to determine the practical limitations on the exercise of extrater-
ritorial personal jurisdiction under Helms-Burton or similar extraterrito-
rial federal legislation.1 51 Several due process issues are raised by Helms-
147. See supra note 113 (stating the various factors developed to address minimum con-
tacts analysis).
148. 647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981).
149. See id. at 314-15 (citing International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)).
150. Many federal district courts have cited and applied the Texas Trading analytic
framework. See Obenchain Corp. v. Corporation Nacionale de Inversiones, 656 F. Supp.
435, 440-41 (W.D. Pa. 1987) (applying the Texas Trading factors to general jurisdiction
analysis); Meadows v. Dominican Republic, 628 F. Supp. 599, 606-07 (N.D. Cal. 1986)
(same); Schmidt v. Polish People's Republic, 579 F. Supp. 23. 26-27 & n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)
(same).
151. See supra notes 142-47 and accompanying text (examining the Asahi opinion and
its impact on lower courts' analysis of personal jurisdiction); see also supra note 49 (ex-
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Burton's imposition of extraterritorial jurisdiction over foreign compa-
nies engaged in "trafficking" in Cuban property, and the Due Process
Clause may limit the extraterritorial application of Title III in certain situ-
ations.' 52 Accordingly, defendants haled into United States courts under
Title III of Helms-Burton may successfully challenge, on due process
grounds, a United States federal court's exercise of personal
jurisdiction.' 53
A. Illustrative Examples
Helms-Burton applies to foreign corporations involved in the traffick-
ing of confiscated United States property in Cuba.154 Importantly, almost
all business ventures in Cuba will entail a joint venture between a foreign
corporation and the Cuban government. 155 Because the Act's definition
of trafficking is extremely broad,' 56 it conceivably covers any commercial
activity arising out of confiscated property. The following examples illus-
plaining that personal jurisdiction under Helms-Burton was intended by Congress to be
guided by existing legal principles).
152. See supra notes 104-09 and accompanying text (discussing the constitutional limita-
tions upon extraterritorial legislation).
153. See infra notes 210-13 and accompanying text (analyzing the constitutional limita-
tions upon the exercise of personal jurisdiction over certain foreign defendants haled into
court under Helms-Burton).
The due process challenges to Helms-Burton may closely parallel litigation which arose
from the application of the commercial activities exception of the FSIA. See supra note 49
(discussing possible similarities in litigation under the Helms-Burton Act and the FSIA).
The commercial activities exception broadly imposes liability upon a foreign sovereign en-
gaged in commercial conduct abroad that has a direct detrimental effect within the United
States. Congress did not articulate any limitations upon the commercial activities excep-
tion's broad application, and due process arguments have been advanced by foreign de-
fendants seeking dismissal of the lawsuit on the basis of lack of personal jurisdiction and
that the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction by United States courts violated due pro-
cess. See Hounduras Aircraft Registry, Ltd. v. Government of Honduras, 883 F. Supp. 685,
687-89 (S.D. Fla. 1995); AMPAC Group Inc. v. Republic of Honduras, 797 F. Supp. 973,
975, 978-79 (S.D. Fla. 1992); see also International Housing Ltd. V. Rafidain Bank Iraq, 712
F. Supp. 1112, 1117-19 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding that a foreign bank haled into a U.S. court
under the commercial activities exception of the FSIA did not have requisite minimum
contacts with the United States to justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction). In Republic
of Argentina v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607 (1992), the Supreme Court recognized that lawsuits
brought under the commercial activities exception of the FSIA may not always satisfy due
process requirements for personal jurisdiction. See id. at 619.
154. See Pub. L. No. 104-114, § 4(11), 110 Stat. 785, 790-91 (defining a person as includ-
ing any entity)..
155. See First, supra note 49, at 300-29 (examining Cuba's recent foreign investment
law which promotes the formation of joint ventures between foreign companies and the
Cuban government); Shari-Ellen Bourque, Note, The Illegality of the Cuban Embargo in
the Current International System, 13 B.U. INT'L L.J. 191, 199-203 (1995) (examining the
Cuban Joint Venture Law).
156. See supra note 41 and accompanying text (defining trafficking under Title III).
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trate the expansive extraterritorial reach of Title III.157 These examples
will be used to assess the potential limitations of Helms-Burton based on
due process arguments that may be advanced by foreign defendants seek-
ing dismissal of a Title III lawsuit. Such an argument would challenge the
United States federal court's ability to exercise valid personal
jurisdiction.
1. Basic Trafficking Violations Under Title III
A foreign, non-Cuban company that engages in commercial activity in
Cuba, such as manufacturing a product, building an industrial plant, or
financing a vacation resort, on property confiscated and expropriated
from an United States owner by the Castro regime, undoubtedly would
be considered to be "trafficking" in violation of Title II.158 The prior
owner of the property, a United States citizen or corporation, could bring
suit against the foreign company in a United States federal district
court.
159
For example, suppose a French company enters a joint-venture with the
Cuban government to build and operate a sugar refinery plant. The
French company buys or leases a sugar plantation from the Cuban gov-
ernment. The plantation is located on property once owned by U.S.
Sugar Inc., a fictitious United States corporation, before it was confis-
cated and expropriated by the Castro regime in 1960. The French com-
pany builds and operates a sugar refinery plant on the property and
engages in direct sales and exports of refined sugar. Under Helms-Bur-
ton, this is considered a straightforward trafficking violation of Title
111.16° The French company may be sued by U.S. Sugar Inc. to recover
damages and, if U.S. Sugar Inc. has a pre-existing certified claim filed
with the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, it would be entitled to
seek treble damages.161
157. See infra notes 158-69 and accompanying text (illustrating the expansive extraterri-
torial reach of Title III).
158. See § 4(11),(13)(B), 110 Stat. at 790-91 (stating trafficking violations directly re-
lated to confiscated property).
159. See § 302(a)(1), 110 Stat. at 815 (stating that trafficking violators will be liable to
the U.S. national with a claim to the confiscated property).
160. See § 4(13), 110 Stat. 790-91 (providing the definition of trafficking); § 302, 110
Stat. 815-19 (stating the private cause of action available to former American owners of
expropriated Cuban property).
161. See § 302(a)(3)(C), 110 Stat. at 815-16 (stating the monetary damages that a certi-
fied claimant may pursue against a Title III trafficker); supra note 38 and accompanying
text (discussing the preference given under Helms-Burton to certified claims with the
FCSC). Concerning the certified claimants with the FCSC, American sugar companies
have the greatest monetary certified claims, totalling several millions of dollars. See
Travieso-Diaz, supra note 16, at app. A. For example, North American Sugar Industries,
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2. Trafficking Liability for Imports and Exports and/or Parent-
Subsidiary Affiliations
Helms-Burton also applies trafficking liability to activities that merely
stem from the expropriated property.162 A foreign, non-Cuban company
that imports a product manufactured on confiscated land in Cuba would
be considered to be trafficking under Helms-Burton. 163 This company
would be exposed to a private cause of action under Title III by the
United States citizen or corporation that previously owned the
property. 16
4
For example, if an Austrian candy company, located in Vienna or in
another foreign country other than Cuba, imports sugar from Cuba and
the sugar originated from the French-owned sugar plantation in the first
example, the Austrian candy company is considered to be trafficking
under Helms-Burton, regardless of whether the sugar is sold in Austria or
as an export. 165 Liability under Title III may be found even if the Aus-
trian company does not own any property in Cuba and is not engaged in
any joint venture or other commercial activities in, or related to, Cuba. 166
Moreover, if the Austrian candy company is a subsidiary corporation
of, for example, a Swiss corporation, that Swiss foreign parent company
could be considered to be profiting from the subsidiary's sale of its goods
made with sugar imported from Cuba.1 67 Therefore, the parent could
also be considered to be trafficking in violation of Title 111.168 Thus, a
Inc. has a certified claim of $97,373,415.00, for its property that was expropriated by the
Castro regime; treble damages would amount to over 300 million dollars. Other U.S. sugar
companies with certified claims include: United Fruit Sugar Company ($85,100,147.00),
West Indies Sugar Corporation ($84,880,958.00), and the American Sugar Company
($81,011,240.00). See id. at app. A.
162. See § 4(13), 110 Stat. at 790-91 (stating that trafficking violations includes "other-
wise benefiting from" and "otherwise engages in trafficking through another person").
The EU has vigorously protested the impact on the extraterritorial reach of Helms-Burton
on indirect imports. See EU Requests WTO Talks, supra note 44, at 762 (discussing the
EU's concern towards Helms-Burton's extraterritorial reach to indirect sugar imports, as
well as direct imports, that include EU products imported to the United States that were
made with sugar imported to the EU from Cuba).
163. See § 4(13), 110 Stat. at 791.
164. See § 302(a)(1), 110 Stat. at 815-17 (explaining the private right of action available
for certified and noncertified claimants).
165. See EU Requests WTO Talks, supra note 44, at 762 (discussing the EU's concerns
regarding Helms-Burton's extraterritorial reach).
166. See supra note 41 (setting forth Title III's definition of "trafficking").
167. See § 4(13), 110 Stat. at 790-91 (providing the Title III definition of trafficking).
168. See Extraterritorial Subsidiary, supra note 45, at 71-77 (examining U.S. courts' as-
sertion of personal jurisdiction over foreign subsidiaries through their parent companies).
To extend the hypothetical even further, suppose a commodity trader at the London
Commodities Exchange resells the Cuban sugar to a foreign company. The foreign com-
pany uses the sugar to manufacture candy. Then, the company uses its profits from its
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foreign parent or a subsidiary company may be exposed to liability under
Title III, even though it is not directly engaged in commercial transac-
tions with Cuba involving expropriated United States property and has
only remote ties to such property.16 9
B. Helms-Burton and Due Process Analysis
As demonstrated above, the potential extraterritorial reach of Helms-
Burton is enormous. Subject matter jurisdiction exists for United States
federal courts to adjudicate Helms-Burton lawsuits because Helms-Bur-
ton is a federal law expressing a clear congressional intent for extraterri-
torial application.17 ° United States courts, however, still must determine
whether due process protections apply to protect the foreign defendant
from arbitrary or unfair assertions of jurisdiction. 1 In deciding whether
the foreign defendant had minimum contacts with the United States so
that the exercise of personal jurisdiction "does not offend traditional no-
,172 wl outions of fair play and substantial justice," courts will focus on (1) the
nature and quality of the defendant's contacts with the United States
(reasonableness); and, (2) the connection between the cause of action
and those contacts (sufficiency of contacts). 173
1. The Reasonableness Prong
Of the five factors Justice Brennan articulated in Asahi to determine
the reasonableness of a determination of personal jurisdiction, three are
particularly relevant to litigation in a United States court under Title III
of Helms-Burton: (1) the burden on the defendant; (2) the interests of the
United States; and, (3) the plaintiff's interest in obtaining relief.1 74
candy sales to pay U.S. income taxes for its U.S. subsidiary. Technically, the U.S. govern-
ment would be considered "profiting" from illegal trafficking under Helms-Burton and
would therefore be open to suit by the former U.S. owner of the Cuban sugar plantation.
See Marcus, supra note 47, at 13 (providing a similar hypothetical to the above to illustrate
the over expansive reach of Title I1).
169. See Desloge, supra note 17, at C4 (reporting that attorneys are targeting U.S. sub-
sidiaries of foreign parent corporations engaged in joint ventures in Cuba which entail
trafficking violations under Title III).
170. See supra note 22 and accompanying text (discussing the clear extraterritorial in-
tent Congress provided in enacting Helms-Burton).
171. See supra notes 105-09 and accompanying texts (discussing legislation as limited by
the due process clause and other constitutional considerations, and explaining that foreign
persons, corporations, and sovereign entities have the same rights as U.S. citizens to object
to a U.S. court's extraterritorial assertion of personal jurisdiction).
172. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
173. See id. at 319; see also supra notes 112-15 and accompanying text (discussing Inter-
national Shoe and its two-pronged minimum contacts test).
174. See Ashai Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987) (citing
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodsen, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980)). U.S. courts will
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In assessing the first factor, considering the burden on the defendant
haled into a United States court under Title III, a court most likely will
examine the inconvenience to defendants litigating in the United
States.175 The United States court conducting personal jurisdiction analy-
sis likely will focus on the burdens placed on the defendant and the inter-
national comity complications created by foreign blocking legislation.176
For example, under the Canadian blocking statute, a Canadian company
may suffer civil penalties and sanctions from Canada if the company sub-
mits to the jurisdiction of a United States court in a Helms-Burton law-
suit or reaches a settlement with a United States national bringing such
an action. 177 This would put the Canadian defendant in the difficult posi-
tion of choosing whether to violate United States or Canadian law.
most likely defer to the congressional findings expressed in Helms-Burton that approxi-
mately $1.8 billion dollars of property was expropriated from U.S. citizens and that the
purposes for enacting Helms-Burton were in part "to protect U.S. nationals against confis-
catory takings and the wrongful trafficking in property confiscated by the Castro regime."
Pub. L. No. 104-114, § 3(6), 110 Stat. 785,789. Such a deference to Congress will provide a
finding of "direct effect" upon the United States, however, indirect trafficking violations
may be still be open to attack. See Obenchain Corp. v. Corporation Nacionale de Inver-
siones, 656 F. Supp. 435, 440-41 (W.D. Pa. 1988) ("[A] mere economic impact on a United
States plaintiff, without other contact by the foreign defendant with the United States, will
not satisfy requirements of due process ... "); Colonial Bank v. Compagnie Generale Mar-
itime et Financiere, 645 F. Supp. 1457, 1465 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (declining to exercise jurisdic-
tion for a claim brought under the FSIA by a party indirectly injured by commercial acts of
a foreign state) (emphasis added).
175. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113; see also Teledyne, Inc. v. Kone Corp., 892 F.2d 1404,
1412 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the foreign
defendant would be unreasonable because of the burdens placed on the defendant in liti-
gating in the United States); Congoleum Corp. v. DLW Aktiengesellschaft, 729 F.2d 1240,
1243 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that the exercise of jurisdiction by a California court over a
German corporation would be unreasonable when the claim arose from activities in Eu-
rope, and the German defendant's only contacts with California were the development of a
sales market); Kern v. Jeppesen Sanderson, Inc., 867 F. Supp. 525, 533-35 (S.D. Tex. 1994)
(holding that the exercise of general jurisdiction in a tort action would be unreasonable,
and offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice, because of the burden
placed on the foreign defendant who merely supervised the design and manufacture of
aircraft).
176. See Reebok Int'l Ltd. v. McLaughlin, 49 F.3d 1387, 1391-93 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding
contacts necessary to support exercise of personal jurisdiction, but declining to do so be-
cause of the conflicting laws of the foreign defendant's country); supra notes 94-103 and
accompanying text (explaining blocking statutes and Supreme Court's interpretation and
treatment of them).
177. See John Urquhart, Wal-Mart Puts Cuban Goods Back on Sale, WALL ST. J., Mar.
14, 1997, at A3 (reporting that Canadian companies violating Helms-Burton face $1 million
in fines in the United States and $1.1 million (U.S.) in fines in Canada if the company
complies with the Act's provisions); infra notes 214-31 and accompanying text (discussing
foreign blocking legislation and the complications it creates for defendants "caught in the
middle" between U.S. law and the laws of their own country).
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While foreign blocking legislation may be considered an unreasonable
burden upon the foreign defendant, this legislation alone cannot be out-
come determinative. 178  As previously discussed, after Hartford Fire a
court merely needs to-examine whether the assertion of subject matter
jurisdiction would be a true conflict with a foreign law or policy. 179 The
reasonable analysis, in regard to determining the validity of personal ju-
risdiction, shifts to examining whether the foreign blocking legislation
was enacted to counter Helms-Burton by ordering mandatory continu-
ance of knowing and intentional trafficking activities by its companies
currently engaged in business in Cuba. 8°
Under Asahi's second and third reasonableness factors, a court must
examine the countervailing interest of the United States in hearing the
suit and the plaintiff's interest in obtaining relief.18 Plaintiffs will likely
rely on Helms-Burton's stated purposes of protecting United States citi-
zens' property rights and advancing United States foreign policy goals
towards Cuba.' 82 Courts will ordinarily conclude that these types of con-
gressional findings establish a strong United States interest in hearing the
suit.'83 In addition, plaintiffs generally will be able to establish that, with-
out a domestic forum, their ability to obtain relief will be restricted." 4
Although the reasonableness prong would be easy to establish under
Helms-Burton, United States courts will still have to proceed to the sec-
ond prong of the traditional minimum contacts test: the connection be-
tween the cause of action and the defendant's contacts with the United
States. 185
178. See supra notes 113, 135-37 (examining International Shoe and the factors used by
courts in succeeding cases to determine reasonableness).
179. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 799 (1993); see also Metro
Indus., Inc. v. Sammi Corp., 82 F.3d 839, 846 n.5 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 181
(1996) (examining the application of the true conflict test); supra notes 82-93 and accompa-
nying text (discussing the Hartford Fire decision and the true conflict test).
180. See supra notes 94-103 and accompanying text.
181. See Ashai Metal Indus. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987).
182. See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text (discussing the purposes articulated
by Congress in enacting Helms-Burton).
183. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text (examining the purposes and goals of
the Helms-Burton Act).
184. See § 301(8), 110 Stat. at 814 ("The international judicial system, as currently struc-
tured, lacks fully effective remedies for the wrongful confiscation of property and for un-
just enrichment from the use of wrongfully confiscated property... "); see also Travieso-
Diaz, supra note 16, at 660-64 (explaining that conpensation for expropriated property has
not been provided to U.S. citizens by Cuba).
185. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316-21 (1945); see also
supra notes 114-20 accompanying text (discussing the factors considered under the "suffi-
ciency of contacts" prong of the minimum contacts test).
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2. The Second Prong: Sufficiency of Contacts
A majority of the lawsuits brought under Helms-Burton will be based
on general jurisdiction, rather than specific jurisdiction, because most of
the trafficking activities under Title III of Helms-Burton will not "arise.
from" or "relate to" the defendants' activities within the United States. 186
The foreign defendant's trafficking activities that give rise to the cause of
action under Helms-Burton will most likely occur abroad, either in Cuba,
another foreign nation, or an international market. 187 As such, a United
States court considering a Helms-Burton lawsuit must determine whether
the foreign defendant has "continuous and systematic" contacts with the
United States.188
As previously discussed, general jurisdiction has a higher minimum
contacts threshold than specific jurisdiction.' 89 The defendant's contacts
do not need to be within the particular boundaries of the forum of the
United States district court exercising jurisdiction.1 90 The court instead
will examine the defendant's contacts anywhere within the territorial
boundaries of the United States.191 Today, in determining general juris-
diction, courts examine whether the nonresident or foreign defendant has
186. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.9
(1984); see also supra notes 121-30 (discussing the differences between general and specific
jurisdiction). If indirect trafficking violations are interpreted to the fullest extent, however,
it is possible that U.S. banks, commodity traders, or other financial or broker entities that
receive proceeds from direct trafficking profits, may be haled into a U.S. federal court
under specific jurisdiction.
187. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text (explaining the Helms-Burton Act's
definition of "trafficking").
188. See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414 n.9. Under the expropriation exception of the
FSIA, a lesser standard of sufficiency of contacts is applied than normally allowed under
the traditional due process standard. See Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965
F.2d 699, 712-13 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that under the expropriation exception of the
FSIA, a foreign hotel's acceptance of U.S. credit cards and traveler's checks were sufficient
contacts with the United States).
189. See Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437,445-48 (1952). There has
been speculation that litigation under Helms-Burton might resurrect the use of quasi-in-
rem jurisdiction. The only role of property in a quasi-in-rem proceeding is to provide the
basis for bringing the defendant into court by attachment of the defendant's property to
ensure enforcement of a judgment. The rationale for a quasi-in-rem proceeding is that the
wrongdoer should not be able to avoid payment of obligations or debts by removing its
assets to a location not subject to the exercise of personal jurisdiction. See Shaffer v. Heit-
ner, 433 U.S. 186, 207-08 (1977) (holding that property can be used or applied in a mini-
mum contacts analysis but is insufficient, alone, for establishing jurisdiction).
190. See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414-16.
191. See Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 490 (1983) (explain-
ing that Congress integrated a general jurisdiction requirement into the FSIA to protect
foreign defendants from unfair exercises of jurisdiction by U.S. courts); see also supra
notes 126-29 (discussing the factors U.S. courts used to analyze "continuous and systematic
contacts" to determine the valid exercise of general jurisdiction).
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a regular place of business in the United States, is licensed to do business
in the United States, or has other "continuous and systematic contacts"
with the United States.192
If a foreign company is charged with trafficking under Title III, it will
be subject to general personal jurisdiction if the company, or its parent,
affiliates, or subsidiaries has a place of business, or other assets, within
the United States.193 It will also be subject to general personal jurisdic-
tion if the company engages in regular commercial transactions within the
United States. 94 Thus, Helms-Burton's minimum reach will cover for-
eign persons or companies that have either an actual presence or ascer-
tainable assets, within the boundaries of the United States, or an implied
presence in the United States through the presence of a parent corpora-
tion, subsidiary, or affiliate.
195
a. Extending General Jurisdiction to Reach Certain Defendants
If a foreign company does not have such a presence within the United
States, United States courts may still attempt to exercise general personal
jurisdiction if the foreign company has other continuous and systematic
contacts with the United States. 96 In this situation, courts may utilize
192. See supra note 129 (providing cases that apply various tests for determining the
valid exercise of general jurisdiction).
193. See City of Phila. v. Morton Salt Co., 289 F. Supp. 723, 725 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (hold-
ing that a foreign corporation is subject to jurisdiction by virtue of its U.S. distributor when
it can be shown that the foreign corporation participated in the distributor's business deci-
sions); see also Lea Brilmayer & Kathleen Paisley, Personal Jurisdiction and Substantive
Legal Relations: Corporations, Conspiracies, and Agency, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1, 8-14 (1986)
(examining due process issues that arise from the exercise of personal jurisdiction over
parents or subsidiaries by virtue of the parent-subsidiary relationship).
194. See supra notes 126-29 (discussing the requirements for general jurisdiction).
195. See Gates Learjet Corp. v. Jensen, 743 F.2d 1325, 1330-31 (9th Cir. 1984) (assessing
the sufficiency of contacts to determine whether such contacts are "continuous and system-
atic"); Kern v. Jeppesen Sanderson, Inc., 867 F. Supp. 525, 534 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (stating the
factors used in general jurisdiction analysis) (citing Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 416); see also
Debra Windsor, Comment, How Specific Can We Make General Jurisdiction: The Search
for a Refined Set of Standards, 44 BAYLOR L. REV. 593, 594-603 (1992) (discussing the
history of general jurisdiction and the early application of the "continuous and systematic"
test); supra notes 126-29 and accompanying text (discussing the exercise of general jurisdic-
tion in the United States).
196. See Payne v. Motorists' Mut. Ins. Co., 4 F.3d 452, 455 (6th Cir. 1993) (creating a
three part test for personal jurisdiction when the defendant does not have continuous and
systematic contacts with the forum). Several U.S. district courts have found sufficient con-
tacts exist with the United States when foreign defendants conduct business through the
U.S. telephone and mail systems. See Chisholm & Co. v. Bank of Jamaica, 643 F. Supp.
1393, 1401-02 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (holding the exercise of personal jurisdiction valid when a
foreign corporation merely negotiated and obtained the services of a U.S. corporation
"through the use of the United States mail and phone systems," and agreed to pay for
those services in the United States); Meadows v. Dominican Republic, 628 F. Supp. 599,
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factors in their personal jurisdiction analysis similar to those articulated
by the Second Circuit in Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Repub-
lic of Nigeria 197
Using four factors to guide their analysis of the sufficiency of the de-
fendant's contacts, the United States court first "must examine the extent
to which the defendants availed themselves of the privileges of American
law."' 98 Involuntary contacts do not satisfy the minimum contacts test. 199
Thus, a Helms-Burton defendant's contacts with the United States must
be voluntary to satisfy due process;"°° the defendant must have "pur-
posely availed" itself of the benefits and protections of United States
law.20 1 A defendant that does not have any contact with the United
States cannot be sued under Title III for merely being involved in, or
tangentially related to, transactions in Cuba that are related to trafficking
604-08 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (holding the sufficiency of contacts requirement was satisfied by
foreign defendants who negotiated and obtained services of American businessmen
"through use of United States mail and telephone systems and agreeing to pay [for those
services] in U.S. dollars").
Recently, a U.S. federal district court held that a foreign defendant's creation of a corpo-
rate advertisement on the World Wide Web of the Internet was also a sufficient contact
with the United States, when persons in the United States accessed the foreign corpora-
tions web site. See Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1338, 1344 (E.D. Mo. 1996)
(upholding the exercise of personal jurisdiction based on contacts with the United States
through the internet).
197. 647 F.2d 300, 314 (2d Cir. 1981) (assessing the sufficiency of the contacts to deter-
mine if such contacts are "continuous and systematic").
198. Texas Trading, 647 F.3d at 314-15; see also supra notes 150-51 and accompanying
text. Application of the second factor, where a court may examine the extent to which
litigation in the United States would be foreseeable to persons engaged in "trafficking" of
expropriated property in Cuba would not really be at issue since the statute requires that a
person must "knowingly and intentionally" be engaged in trafficking activities in order to
be exposed to liability. Given the widespread publicity and international reaction to
Helms-Burton, most foreign companies in Cuba have attempted to determine if they may
be exposed to Title III liability for their activities in Cuba. It may be argued, however, that
foreign defendants relied on either the "blocking legislation" of their sovereign govern-
ment or of Cuba to exclude them from entering United States courts, and therefore, main-
tained that it was not foreseeable for them to litigate under Helms-Burton in the United
States.
199. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (noting that unilateral activity by
one party does not impute contacts on the other party); see also supra notes 113, 117-18
and accompanying text (examining the reasonableness and sufficiency of contacts factors
used in personal jurisdictional analyses).
200. See Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253 (stating that a defendant must take affirmative action
to avail itself of the privilege in conducting activities in the United States forum); see also
supra note 115 and accompanying text (discussing that contacts with the United States
must be voluntary to satisfy due process).
201. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295-97 (1980)
("[T]he defendant's conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should
reasonably anticipate being haled into court there."); see also supra note 117 and accompa-
nying text (explaining the purposeful availment requirement).
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of expropriated American property because contacts with former Ameri-
can property in another country cannot be construed as voluntary con-
tacts with the United States.202 In many cases, to find sufficient contacts,
the United States plaintiff would have to pierce the corporate veil be-
cause United States affiliates of foreign companies doing business in the
United States are likely to be different from the sister foreign subsidiary
doing business with Cuba. °3
Under the third factor of the Texas Trading analysis, a court must ex-
amine the inconvenience to the defendants of litigating in the United
States. 0 4 Like the reasonableness analysis under the first prong of the
minimum contacts test, a court could focus on the burdens placed on de-
fendants and the international comity complications created by foreign
blocking statutes. 0 s In particular, a court may focus on the consequences
faced by a foreign defendant, such as suffering civil penalties and sanc-
tions with its home country under blocking statutes if it submits to the
jurisdiction of a United States court or settles with a United States plain-
tiff or the United States government.20 6
Under the fourth factor, a court must examine the countervailing inter-
est of the United States in hearing the suit.207 Under Hartford Fire, a
court needs to examine only whether the assertion of jurisdiction would
be in direct conflict with a foreign law. 20 8 Once again, the analysis shifts
202. See Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253 (explaining that a nonresident defendant cannot be
held accountable for its involuntary contacts through the unilateral activities of another
resident entity).
203. See STEPHEN B. PRESSER, PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL §§ 3.01-.16 (1996) (sur-
veying federal law regarding piercing the corporate veil); Daniel G. Brown, Comment,
Jurisdiction Over a Corporation on the Basis of the Contacts of an Affiliated Corporation:
Do You Have to Pierce the Corporate Veil?, U. CIN. L. REV. 595, 598-616 (1992) (reviewing
the legal standards governing piercing the corporate veil and the application of these prin-
ciples to the assertion of jurisdiction over affiliated corporations).
204. See Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 314-15 (2d
Cir. 1981) (stating that it is not inconvenient for a Nigerian party engaged in international
business transactions with a U.S. corporation to litigate in the United States because
"[elvery modern transnational commercial contract presents problems of adjudicatory
cost"); see also supra notes 148-50 (stating the sufficiency of contacts test the Second Cir-
cuit created in Texas Trading).
205. See supra notes 94-103 and accompanying text (explaining foreign blocking
statutes).
206. See supra notes 94-96 (describing the different types of foreign blocking statute
mechanisms).
207. See Texas Trading, 647 F.2d at 314-15 (noting that Congress expressed its intent
under the FSIA to provide Americans with "access to the courts" and stating that a U.S.
forum has a "manifest interest in providing effective means of redress for its residents").
208. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 798-99 (1993) (stating that
since subject matter jurisdiction was valid "[t]he only substantial question in this litigation
is whether 'there is in fact a true conflict between domestic and foreign law."').
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to balancing the interests of the opposing nation's foreign blocking legis-
lation with the interests of the United States in adjudicating the lawsuit.
It is apparent that the due process limitations intertwined in the Hartford
Fire "direct conflict" standard complicate the "reasonableness" and "suf-
ficiency of the minimum contacts" determinations necessary for a United
States court to validly assert jurisdiction over a foreign defendant.2"9
b. Due Process Arguments to Counter Assertions of Personal
Jurisdiction Based on Ancillary Trafficking Violations
Foreign defendants haled into a United States court should vigorously
oppose broad extensions of Title III liability based on trafficking viola-
tions for activities stemming from, or not directly related to, expropriated
property or parent-subsidiary affiliations that allegedly profit from traf-
ficking activities. For lawsuits alleging indirect trafficking violations, due
process arguments should be advanced by a Helms-Burton defendant to
contest the assertion of personal jurisdiction by a United States federal
court.2"0 If the Helms-Burton defendant is engaged in or exposed to traf-
ficking for indirect activities, or is a parent company profiting from indi-
rect trafficking of its subsidiary, it may successfully challenge the
assertion of personal jurisdiction.211 These due process arguments may
be advanced under both the reasonableness prong and the sufficiency of
contacts prong of the minimum contacts test.212 These arguments may be
successful even if the subsidiary or parent has business locations or assets
within the United States or is otherwise deemed to have continuous and
209. See id. at 796-98. These due process arguments, based on lack of minimum con-
tacts, would be similar to the challenges against lawsuits brought under the commercial
activities exception of the FSIA. See Walpex Trading Co. v. Yacimientos Petroliferos Fis-
cales Bolivanos, 712 F. Supp. 383, 390 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) ("Congress did not have the author-
ity to override the constitutional due process constraints underlying personal jurisdiction
when it drafted the FSIA."); see also supra note 49 (discussing the potential parallels be-
tween litigation arising under Title III of Helms-Burton and litigation brought under the
commercial activities exception of the FSIA).
210. See supra notes 105-30 and accompanying text (examining the due process protec-
tions afforded foreign defendants through the requirements for U.S. courts' valid exercise
of personal jurisdiction).
211. See Kuenzle v. HTM Sport-Und Freizeitgerate, 102 F.3d 453, 455-60 (10th Cir.
1996) (holding that a foreign manufacture lacked sufficient contacts with the United States
and was not subject to the exercise of either specific or general jurisdiction by the U.S.
forum); see also supra notes 174-75 (providing cases where courts declined to exercise
personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants based on their insufficient contacts with the
United States).
212. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316-19 (1945); SEC v.
Knowles, 87 F.3d 413, 417-19 (10th Cir. 1996) (analyzing a defendant's sufficiency of con-
tacts with the United States and upholding the exercise of personal jurisdiction); see also
supra notes 110-15 and accompanying text (explaining the International Shoe minimum
contacts analysis).
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systematic contacts with the United States to satisfy the general jurisdic-
tion requirement.213
C. True Conflict Limitations on the Extraterritorial Reach of the
Helms-Burton Act: Foreign Blocking Legislation
Without more articulable and coherent standards to guide the legal an-
alytical framework developed to determine the valid exercise of extrater-
ritorial jurisdiction, the Hartford Fire true conflict test will surely become
the focus of future controversy. The reexamination of the true conflict
test is even more probable since the use of foreign blocking legislation is
increasing in response to United States extraterritorial legislation like
Helms-Burton.214 Lawsuits brought in United States courts under
Helms-Burton will face many complications created by foreign blocking
legislation created to blunt the extraterritorial reach of United States
law.2 15
Canadian blocking statutes, originally enacted in 1992 and recently ex-
panded to counter Helms-Burton, provide the most vivid example.216
The Foreign Extraterritorial Measures (United States) Order (FEMO)
directs Canadian businesses and their officers not to comply with an ex-
213. See Tubular Inspectors, Inc. v. Petroleos Mexicanos, 977 F.2d 180, 183-86 (5th Cir.
1992) (analyzing whether a foreign defendant had requisite minimum contacts with the
United States to exercise subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA, and holding that the
defendant's unrelated commercial contacts were "sufficiently isolated" to deny subject
matter jurisdiction); Arriba Ltd. v. Petroleos Mexicanos, 962 F.2d 528, 533-34 (5th Cir.
1992) (holding that a foreign defendant did not have sufficiently related commercial activi-
ties to satisfy the jurisdictional requirements to exercise subject matter jurisdiction under
the commercial activities exception of the FSIA); Vencedora Oceanica Navigacion, S.A. v.
Compagnie Nationale Algerienne de Navigation, 730 F.2d 195, 200-04 (5th Cir. 1984)
(holding that the commercial activities exception of the FSIA did not apply and that sub-
ject matter jurisdiction was lacking because there was an insufficient nexus between the
plaintiff's grievance and the foreign state's commercial activity within the United States).
214. See Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 778-79; see also Dam, supra note 1, at 290-92 &
nn.10-11 (examining the Hartford decision in the context of an international policy deci-
sion and how domestic economic policies are increasingly conflicting with international
relations due to the accelerated integration of the global economy); supra notes 95-98 and
accompanying text (surveying the application of blocking statutes).
215. See EU Approves Blocking Legislation in Reaction to Helms-Burton Act, 13 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 13, at 1243 (July 31, 1996) (discussing the provisions of the Euro-
pean Commission's blocking legislation aimed at preventing European companies from
complying with the Helms-Burton Act); see also supra notes 94-103 and accompanying
text.
216. See Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, R.S.C. ch. F-29, §§ 1-6 (1992)(Can.),
amended by 130 C. Gaz. No. 2, 610, 611-15 (1996); see also Douglas H. Forsythe, Canada:
Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act Incorporating the Amendments Countering the U.S.
Helms-Burton Act, 36 I.L.M. 11l, 112-14 (1997) (explaining the Canadian policy rationales
for its blocking legislation aimed at countering Helms-Burton, and summarizing its main
provisions).
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traterritorial measure of the United States affecting trade or commerce
between Canada and Cuba.1 7 FEMO states that any United States legis-
lation that is likely "to prevent, impede or reduce trade or commerce
between Canada and Cuba" will be construed as an extraterritorial mea-
sure of the United States. 18 FEMO may seriously test the Hartford Fire
true conflict standard.219
Under the Hartford Fire analysis, in the absence of a true conflict be-
tween domestic and foreign law, the extension of extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion can be validly assumed. 20 While extraterritorial subject matter
jurisdiction may be validly assumed because of express congressional in-
tent, the scope of the application of Helms-Burton is not clear, and ex-
pansive application of its extraterritorial reach cannot be assumed. The
true conflict standard may be open to two interpretations. Under the first
interpretation, a true conflict may exist only if the foreign sovereign man-
dates a particular activity. 21 Under the second interpretation, a true
conflict exists when a foreign defendant cannot simultaneously comply
with the laws of his own country and those of the United States.222
1. "Foreign Sovereign Compulsion" Direct Conflict Interpretation
Under the foreign sovereign compulsion interpretation, FEMO would
not be considered a true conflict with Helms-Burton because the Cana-
dian law does not mandate that Canadian companies engage in commer-
cial activities in Cuba that are considered trafficking violations under
Helms-Burton. 2 3 Under this interpretation, a true or direct conflict does
not exist because a Canadian company has the choice of engaging in com-
mercial activities that are Helms-Burton trafficking violations.22 4
217. See R.S.C. ch. F29 §§ 3-6, at 612-13 (requiring Canadian corporations to report
attempted extraterritorial assertions of United States law related to trade with Cuba and
prohibiting such corporations from attempting to comply with any U.S. extraterritorial
measure).
218. Id. at 612.
219. See Fairley, supra note 20, at 30-32 (analyzing FEMO within the context of the
direct conflict standard).
220. See Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 797-99.
221. See Lowenfeld, supra note 90, at 45-47 (examining the Supreme Court's two differ-
ent interpretations of the true conflict standard).
222. See Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 798-99; see also Metro Indus., Inc. v. Sammi Corp.,
82 F.3d 839, 846 n.5 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 181 (1996) (examining the application
of the direct conflict test).
223. See supra note 91 (providing an example of a sovereign compulsion defense scena-
rio under Helms-Burton).
224. See Lowenfeld, supra note 90, at 45-48 (explaining the Hartford majority's position
that no true conflict exists "where a person subject to regulation by two states can comply
with the laws of both").
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2. "Inability to Simultaneously Comply" True Conflict Interpretation
Under the inability to simultaneously comply interpretation, a true
conflict exists when a foreign defendant cannot simultaneously comply
with the laws of his own country and those of the United States. 2 5
FEMO directs Canadian businesses and their officers not to comply with
an extraterritorial measure of the United States regarding any trade or
commerce between Canada and Cuba.226 Under the plain language of
Title III, and the purposes articulated by Congress, it is apparent that
Helms-Burton is an extraterritorial measure designed to deter commerce
between Canada and Cuba.227 Based on this language, Helms-Burton
could be construed to be a true conflict with the Canadian FEMO law.
Unless this conflict has a demonstrably severe negative impact upon
United States foreign relations with Canada, however, such a conflict
probably will not be considered substantial enough for a United States
court to refuse to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction. 28 On the other
hand, if this type of conflict is considered severe under this interpretation
of the Hartford Fire true conflict test, extraterritorial jurisdiction cannot
be asserted by United States courts upon Canadian citizens or businesses
conducting transactions in Cuba that are considered to be trafficking.
229
225. See Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 799 (explaining that the defendants did not argue
that British law mandated a particular action prohibited by U.S. law, and therefore, no true
conflict existed to bar the assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction). For example, assume
that a French company voluntarily engages in commercial activities in Cuba that violated
Helms-Burton and the company is sued by the former U.S. owner of the property. France
has enacted Various blocking statutes that bar recognition of the extraterritorial assertion
of jurisdiction by U.S. courts. The French company, therefore, would be considered unable
to simultaneously comply with both the French blocking statute and U.S. law, and there-
fore a true conflict would exist under this interpretation.
226. Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, R.S.C., ch. F-29 (1992)(Can.), amended by
130 C. Gaz. No. 2, 610, 611-15 (1996).
227. See Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 611-15; see also Fairley, supra note 20 at 30-32 (ana-
lyzing FEMO in conjunction with the Helms-Burton Act and concluding that a direct con-
flict does exist).
228. See Soci6t6 Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States District Court for
the S. District of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 543-47 (1987) (stating that a foreign nation's blocking
statute precluding disclosure of evidence does not deprive a U.S. court of the power to
order a party subject to its jurisdiction to produce evidence, even though the act of produc-
tion may violate the foreign blocking statute); see also supra notes 102-03 and accompany-
ing text (examining the Court's treatment of foreign blocking statutes and interpretation of
its true conflict standard).
229. See Fairley, supra note 20, at 30-32 ("A U. S. federal court should find ... [that the
Canadian blocking legislation] creates a direct conflict precluding compliance by a Cana-
dian defendant with any Title III remedy.").
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3. The Future of the True Conflict Standard and Helms-Burton
Blocking Statutes
Mexico, Cuba, and the European Union have enacted blocking legisla-
tion aimed at vitiating the extraterritorial reach of Helms-Burton. 30
These blocking statutes may neutralize, or at least seriously hinder,
Helms-Burton's effect on the major trading partners of the United
States.2 3 1 If litigation under Helms-Burton proceeds, the Supreme Court
may eventually be called upon to re-evaluate its current extraterritorial
jurisdictional analysis. Confronted with the expansive extraterritorial
reach of Helms-Burton, the Supreme Court will need to redefine the true
conflict standard to alleviate the confusion resulting from extraterritorial
legislation litigation.
IV. USING AN EFFECTS ANALYSIS TO DETERMINE THE LIMITATIONS
OF EXTRATERRITORIAL LEGISLATION:
TIMBERLANE REVISITED
While some legal principles and guidelines have been established to
determine whether United States legislation was intended to have an ex-
traterritorial effect, no comprehensive principles have been developed to
determine the limitations on the exercise of express extraterritorial
legislation. 32
The "true conflict" standard established in Hartford Fire will not suf-
fice because it lacks an articulable definition or guidelines for lower
courts to determine whether a true conflict actually exists. 233 Assuming
the Castro regime remains in power and that Congress does not repeal
Helms-Burton, the Supreme Court may be given the opportunity to re-
solve the confusion and bring United States courts out of the fog created
230. See Jorge A. Vargas, Mexico: Act To Protect Trade and Investment from Foreign
Norms that Contravene International Law, 36 I.L.M. 133, 134-43 (1997) (explaining Mexi-
can responses to U.S. extraterritorial measures and providing the text of the Mexican legis-
lation); European Union: Council Regulation (EC) No. 2271/96, Protecting Against the
Effects of the Extra-Territorial Application of Legislation Adopted by a Third Country, 36
I.L.M. 125 (1997) (providing the text to the European blocking legislation enacted specifi-
cally in response to Helms-Burton).
231. See European Commission Calls Cuba Bill "Clear" Violation of International Law,
13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 10, at 368 (Mar. 6, 1996) (noting the EU's criticism of the
Helms-Burton Act); NAFTA Designates Confer on Complaint Against Helms-Burton
Under Chapter 20, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 27, at 1093-94 (July 3, 1996) (noting that
Canada and Mexico are contesting Helms-Burton and arguing that it violates the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)).
232. See supra Part II (detailing the legal principles used to address the application and
limitations of extraterritorial assertions of subject matter and personal jurisdictions).
233. See supra notes 75-80 and accompanying text (explaining the Timberlane court's
consideration of international comity).
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by its past decisions addressing jurisdictional analysis and extraterritorial-
ity. If Title III is not implemented in the near future, the Court may be
called upon to address these issues arising under similarly broad extrater-
ritorial federal legislation.234
As a possible solution to the extraterritorial jurisdiction morass, United
States courts could employ a variation of the effects doctrine. Although
originally established to determine whether United States law could have
an extraterritorial effect when congressional intent is not clear,235 United
States courts could utilize an effects doctrine to determine the limitations
on the extraterritorial reach of United States law when congressional in-
tent for an extraterritorial effect is clear, but the actual scope of the legis-
lation's extraterritorial reach and the limitations to its application are not
clear.236 The three-pronged effects test articulated in Timberlane could
be used as a framework to determine the actual scope and limitations
upon extraterritorial legislation, even when the extraterritorial intent of
such legislation is already clear.237
Under the first prong, the foreign conduct must impact United States
imports, exports, or interstate commerce in order to establish that it is
appropriate for United States courts to exercise jurisdiction over foreign
activities.2 38 The second prong entails a determination of whether the
effect presents a significantly large and demonstrated injury resulting
from the conduct sufficient to extend the extraterritorial reach of the leg-
islation.239 Under the third prong, the court would weigh foreign policy
and international comity considerations in determining whether it should
find jurisdiction.24 ° In the end, however, the court must balance and
234. See supra note 13 (providing examples of current extraterritorial legislation).
235. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945) (stat-
ing the basic analytic framework for asserting extraterritorial jurisdiction when congres-
sional intent is not clear, which later became know as the "effects test"); see also supra
notes 60-71 and accompanying text (discussing the Alcoa effects doctrine).
236. See supra notes 60-62 (discussing the courts' current application of the effects test).
Of course, this could set the Supreme Court and Congress on a collision course, and the
Court historically has tried to avoid such conflicts involving foreign affairs. See Jonathan I.
Charney, Judicial Deference in Foreign Relations, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 805, 806-07 (1989)
(explaining the practical reasons for courts to defer to the executive and legislative
branches in foreign affairs).
237. See Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 613-15 (9th Cir. 1976);
see supra note 81 (providing other Circuits that created a similar test); see also supra notes
60-71 and accompanying text (discussing the effects doctrine and its application).
238. See Timberlane, 549 F.2d 613-15.
239. See id.; see also Gregorian v. Izvestia, 871 F.2d 1515, 1527 (9th Cir. 1989) ("[M]ere
financial loss suffered by a plaintiff in the United States as a result of the action abroad of a
foreign state does not constitute a 'direct effect."').
240. See Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 609. The court recognized the significance of weighing
the "regard for comity and the prerogatives of other nations" in determining the limita-
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weigh the considerations of all three prongs; considerations under the
third prong cannot be determinative standing alone. 4a
In Timberlane, the court recognized the significance of weighing the
"regard for comity and the prerogatives of other nations" in determining
the limitations upon the extraterritorial reach of United States antitrust
laws.2 42 It is not suggested that the judiciary actively participate in for-
eign affairs; rather United States courts should merely be cognizant of the
international repercussions that may result from its decisions.2 43 Courts
should be allowed to weigh international comity factors against the deter-
minations made under the first two prongs of the effects analysis.
The court in Timberlane found that limitation of the exercise of juris-
diction would be appropriate when "the interests of the United States are
too weak and the foreign harmony incentive for restraint [of jurisdiction]
too strong. '244 Using this statement as a guideline, courts should, at a
minimum, limit refusal to exercise jurisdiction to situations where it is
plain that the exercise of jurisdiction over the foreign defendant would be
outrageously offensive. Jurisdiction should be limited also when the ac-
tual interests of the United States are negligible or are demonstrably out-
weighed by the interests of the foreign defendant's country.
Alternatively, if international comity analysis as a threshold determina-
tion to determine the validity of exercising subject matter jurisdiction is
rejected, courts should actively employ international comity considera-
tions in their personal jurisdiction analysis.245 These considerations could
be analyzed under both the reasonable prong and sufficiency of contacts
prong of the minimum contacts framework. The primary purpose of such
analyses is to provide foreign defendants with constitutional due process
protection from unfair assertions of jurisdiction.
V. CONCLUSION
With the continued passage of increasingly bold extraterritorial legisla-
tion, the judiciary will be less and less able to maintain a passive role in
tions upon the extraterritorial reach of U.S. antitrust laws. Id. at 612. See generally Mc-
Kinnon, supra note 79 (examining the history and development of extraterritorial analysis
and discussing the application and limitations upon comity factors in such analyses).
241. See supra notes 110-47 and accompanying text (examining International Shoe and
the evolution of the minimum contacts analysis).
242. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 612.
243. See supra notes 72-82 and accompanying text (explaining international comity
considerations).
244. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 609.
245. See supra note 87 and accompanying text (explaining that the Hartford Fire major-
ity implicitly stated that international comity considerations could be addressed in a court's
personal jurisdiction analysis).
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foreign affairs. Helms-Burton may finally provide the Supreme Court
with an opportunity to address the limits of the extraterritorial reach of
United States law. If Title III is enforced and cases are filed, the
Supreme Court will need to confront the limits of extraterritorial legisla-
tion and to clarify existing legal standards by setting and applying a co-
herent analysis to determine the constitutional and legal limitations of
Helms-Burton. While Title III actions may never come before the courts,
the Act represents a recent trend whereby United States legislation has
significant and direct extraterritorial reach. Furthermore, the use of ex-
traterritorial legislation by the United States continues to expand as the
international economy becomes more integrated and other foreign policy
options become less viable. Sooner or later, the Supreme Court will be
called upon to provide a coherent legal framework for future extraterrito-
rial legislation promulgated by Congress.
Bret A. Sumner
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